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Balancing Investors' Rights with Environmental
Protection in International Investment
Arbitration: An Assessment of Recent Trends
in Investment Treaty Draffing
CAMILLE MARTINI*

I.

Introduction

International investment law and the current investor-state dispute
settlement system are going through a legitimacy crisis.' With parallels to
the intense criticism faced by the international trade framework more than
twenty years ago,2 a wide range of critiques,3 both at the substantial and
procedural levels, have been formulated towards both the international
investment legal framework and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
mechanism. Scholars have opposed the asymmetry4 of International
Investment Agreements (ILAs),5 which allegedly jeopardizes states' exercise
of national sovereignty and limits their right to regulate.6 The substantive
protection granted by states to foreign investors under international
investment law has been criticized as being broad, vague,7 and a source of
uncertainty.8 ISDS itself has been denounced as "tainted by incoherencies
and imbalances."9 Deficiencies in the procedural mechanisms established by
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
* The author would like to thank Frank J. Garcia, Professor of Law & Dean's Global Fund
Scholar at Boston College Law School, and Lise Johnson from the Columbia Center on
Sustainable Development for their help and support. The opinions expressed in this article
remain his own.
1. Frank Garcia et al, Reforming the InternationalInvestment Regime: Lessonsfrom International
Trade Law, 18 J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 861, 862 (2015).
2. Id. at 863.
3. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT, 63 (Kluwer Law International ed. 2009).
4. Andra K. Biorklund, The Necessity of Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVEsTMENT, 373-74 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. ed.,
2011).
5. The term "International investment Agreements" (HAs) is substituted to the term
"Bilateral Investment Treaties" (BITs) whenever applicable, to include investment chapters
contained in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
6. Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on a State's Regulatory
Autonomy Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. OF INT'L ARB. 245, 249 (2012).
7. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbirtation: Privatizing Public
InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1521, 1589 (2005).
8. Id. at 1583.
9. Bijlmakers, supra note 6, at 245.
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and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention), which established in
1965 the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), have also been pointed out.10
Many actors have pointed to the procedural deficiencies of the current
ISDS system. Engaged at the frontline, several states have dissociated
themselves from a framework they contributed to shaping their dual role as
negotiators of and parties to IIAs as well as defendants in ISDS proceedings.
A few developing countries, Bolivia," Ecuador,12 and Venezuela,'3
denounced the ICSID Convention. Such defiance towards the current
system is not fortuitous. Developing countries have been victims of
"asymmetries of power... [and] of information in dealing with developed
countries and foreign investors,'4 which have led to the implementation of a
system tailored to benefit multinational enterprises (MNEs) of developed,
capital exporting countries. While I do not intend in this article to
undertake a thorough assessment of these critiques, a preliminary conclusion
can already be drawn: international investment law has failed to project itself
as a "comprehensive governance system meant to ensure justice and the rule
of law in one aspect of international economic relations, the allocation of
investment capital."15
The field of environmental protection has particularly crystallized the
existing tensions within the international investment legal framework
between foreign investor's rights and states' right to regulate.16 It is first
necessary to recall that the primary purpose of the international investment
legal framework is the promotion and protection of foreign direct
investments (FDI), as a means to achieve economic growth. HAs are not
construed as corrective tools to compensate for the absence of a binding
conventional framework regulating cross-border activities by MNEs and
10. See, e.g., Dobyun Kim, The Annulment Committee's Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID
Arbitration: the Need to Move Away From an Annulment Based System, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rmv. 242, 249
(2011) (arguing that annulment committees have been unable to bring more coherence to the
ICSID arbitration system).
11. Press Release, Int'l Ctr. for Inv. of Disputes, Bolivia submits a notice under Article 71 of
the ICSID Convention (May 15, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSID/StaticFiles/
Announcement3.html.
12. Press Release, Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Ecuador finiquita convenio con el
CIADI (July 14, 2009), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/puentes/news/ecuador-finiquitaconvenio-con-el-ciadi.
13. Press Release, Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Venezuela's Withdrawal From
ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/
13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/.
14. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating MultinationalCorporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border
Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 451, 479 (2008); see Frank Garcia et al., Reforming the InternationalInvestment Regime:
Lessons From International Trade Law, 18 J. OF INT'L EcoN. L. 861, 862 (2015).
15. Garcia et al., supra note 14, at 874.
16. For a more detailed analysis of the right to regulate in international investment law, see
generally AIKATEIGNI Tm, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
(Marc Bungenberg et al ed., 1st ed. 2016).
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their impact on the environment. More generally, HAs are not by
themselves legal instruments promoting environmental concerns.17
Nonetheless, the social aspects of international investment law ought to be
addressed. As stated by Federico Ortino, "[e]conomic growth and prosperity
engenders higher societal expectation for higher quality jobs, employment
protection, workers' participation in business management, corporate social
responsibility, health standards and protection, etc. Even more crucially,
economic growth and prosperity makes available the resources necessary to
meet such expectations."'8 Yet, an overview of the current framework reveals
that international investment law has not developed in a way that fosters the
mutual benefits of host states and foreign investors. Indeed, the current
ISDS system, as developed by the arbitral practice, is asymmetric, fully
oriented towards the protection of investors' rights.
While international investment law has developed on the premise that
FDI is inherently good-and therefore, that sustainable development would
necessarily follow, the reality is quite different. IAs do play a role in
reducing political and regulatory risk, from a foreign investor's perspective,19
but they have also been used by international investors as a basis to challenge
environmental regulations when they were conflicting with their economic
interests.20

Such

antagonism

between

the

public interest

(including

environmental concerns), the protection of property, and commercial
interests of foreign investors has logically crystallized around investment
arbitration and the ISDS mechanism.
From the investor's perspective, regulations can create additional barriers
and lead to potential losses.21 In contrast, several factors such as new
scientific developments, shifts in public opinion, improved understanding of
environmental impacts and how to prevent them, or changes in modes of
production or consumption frequently require states to adapt their
environmental regulatory framework.22 States may also undertake new
commitments pursuant to the adoption of international environmental
agreements. The resulting conflict between a host country's environmental
policies whether or not they arise from binding legal instruments and its
international obligations under an applicable IIA can eventually act as a
deterrent. Under the threat of damages claims brought before arbitral
tribunals by foreign investors impacted by a new regulatory measure, a host
17. See Rosalien Diepeveen et al., Bridging the gap between internationalinvestment law and the
environment, 30 UTRECHT JOURNAL OF INT'L & EuR. L. 145, 151 (2014).
18. Federico Ortino, The social dimension of internationalinvestment agreements: Drafting a new
BIT/MIT model? ORGANISATION FOR EcONOMIc CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, (Mar.
27-28, 2008), https://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311350.pdf.
19. Wolfgang Alschner & Elizabeth Tuerk, Fostering Sustainable Development, in INVESTMENT
LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES 217, 221 (Freya Baetens
ed., 2013).
20. Bijhnakers, supra note 6.
21. SAVERIo Di BENEDETTO, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
13 (Andrea K Bjorklund & August Reinisch eds., 1st ed. 2013).
22. Id. at 39.
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country might be prevented from implementing legitimate regulatory
measures, such as the enforcement of new standards in energy production,
resource management or regarding the conservation of natural resources and
ecosystems, 23 in prospect of long and costly arbitral proceedings.24
At the same time, investors may also be discouraged from undertaking
long-term investments abroad, which require a stable and predictable
regulatory framework.25 These concerns are heightened by the uncertainty
surrounding the scope of states' obligations26 resulting to some extent from
the varying interpretations of HA standards by arbitral tribunals and more
generally, from the absence of a multilateral instrument containing a set of
common standards harmonizing the treatment of foreign investors by host
states around the world.
The notion of sustainable development, which has been employed as an
attempt to reconcile environmental protection with economic
development,27 could be a solution to better articulate the interplay of
international investment law with other areas of public policy. The
increasing popularity of the notion of sustainable development and its
appropriation in the field of international investment law have arguably
produced a concrete shift in investment policies.28 This phenomenon is
important given the dual potential of FDI to foster sustainable
development29 as well as negatively impact the environment or human
rights.30 Nevertheless, in practice, HAs have not yet engaged successfully
with the social dimension of the international investment regime,31 including
the protection of the environment, at least not in a systemic fashion. An
OECD Survey, published in 2011, reveals that about ninety-two percent of
23. See Asa Romson, InternationalLaw and the Environment, in SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT

IN WORLD INVEsTMENT LAW 373-74 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al ed., 2011).
24. The recent Vattenfall and Philipp Morris cases illustrate the potential deterrent effect of
such lawsuits, not only on the respondent regarding future policies, but also on other countries
which would have been incline to implement similar measures. See Vattenfall Europe

Generation AG v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Award (Mar. 11,
2011) (formerly Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG & Co.
KG v. The Federal Republic of Germany); Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth
of Australia, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12
(Dec. 17, 2015); Philip Morris Brands Sirl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos
S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016)
(formerly FTR Holding SA, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental
Republic of Uruguay).
25. Romson, supra note 23, at 39.
26. Di BENEDETTO, supra note 21, at 14.
27. JORGE E. ViruALEs, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
LAw 11 (Cambridge University Press ed. 1st ed. 2012).
28. See U.N.

ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL

Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Policy Framework for

Sustainable Development, 13-24, UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2015/5 (2015).
29. Alschner & Tuerk, supra note 19, at 245.
30. Bijlmakers, supra note 6, at 245.
31. Id. at 244-47.

2017]

BALANCING INVESTORS' RIGHTS

533

IIAs do not contain any reference to the environment.32 This high
percentage could be explained by the fact that states did not anticipate that
the standards of protection negotiated in IAs would be invoked by foreign
investors to challenge their environmental policies. According to this view,
environmental provisions were simply deemed unnecessary by contracting
states in light of the original purpose of IAs.
The results found by the OECD survey, however, do not mean that
investment arbitration tribunals have systematically disregarded the impact
of investment activities on the environment or disqualified states'
environmental regulations when they conflicted with a foreign investor's
right under an IA. In fact, while some scholars have pointed to the "need
for reform,"33 others stress that many arbitral tribunals have followed a
"balanced approach when applying and interpreting protection standards,
. . . weighing investment protection against the inherent right of the

sovereign State to regulate."34 This conclusion tends to mitigate the
apparent imbalances of the investment framework. Yet, incoherencies in the
application of the substantive protection granted to foreign investors in HAs
have fueled a growing concern regarding states' ability to implement
regulatory change in a context of a multiplication of arbitral claims
challenging adverse environmental measures. As a consequence, states have
introduced in IAs new types of provisions that seek to safeguard certain
levels of policy space. 35
The purpose of the present paper is to ascertain the dichotomy that exists
today. On the one hand, a majority amongst states, scholars, practitioners,
and the civil society have acknowledged the need to rebalance international
investment law to better include public interest concerns. Accordingly,
states have negotiated treaty provisions seeking to tackle these imbalances.
On the other hand, arbitral tribunals have responded to this alleged lacunae
with mechanisms which reinserted the public interest into the equation, with
various degrees of success. Recent awards show that the arbitral practice has
reached a certain maturity, even if each proceeding follows a strictly
construed mandate based on the provisions of a specific IA. Bringing these
two considerations together, this article seeks to determine whether the new
trends in investment treaty drafting are capable of solving the inherent
imbalances of the current framework.
32. Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, 2011/1 OECD Working Papers on International
Investment, Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements: A Survey 5
(June 1, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/ investment-policy/WP-201 1I.pdf.
33. Kate M. Supnik, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing
Interests in InternationalInvestment Law, 59 DuKE L. J. 343, 355 (2009); see Frank Garcia et al.,
Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons From International Trade Law, 18 J. OF
INT'L EcoN. L. 861, 862 (2015).
34. Bijlmakers, supra note 6, at 254.
35. For a typology of these measures, see Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32 (Part B of this article
seeks to provide an assessment of the most significant provisions.).
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In the first part, this article will assess, based on relevant investment
arbitration awards, how tribunals have interpreted HAs' provisions to solve
the issues arising when investors' rights and states' ability to regulate on
environmental matters were in conflict. It will demonstrate that tribunals'
interpretations of investors' rights have diverged in the search of the right
balance between investors' protection and public interest concerns of the
host state. While these diverging interpretations illustrate the need to
develop new approaches, arbitral practice has progressively implemented a
framework that does take into account states' right to regulate.
In the second part, this article will provide a more detailed analysis of the
provisions in the field of environmental protection that states have
incorporated in newly drafted IIAs in order to preserve a threshold level of
policy space. It will assess whether these provisions are "arbitration-proof,"
putting them in perspective with the arbitral practice, and demonstrate that
while these clauses may not be directly enforceable by states as a defense in
arbitral proceedings, they share common features with the solutions already
developed by arbitral tribunals and will shape the interpretation of IIAs'
substantive provisions in future claims. These clauses will provide more
coherency and legitimacy to international investment law as a whole by
correcting the asymmetric structure of HAs and incorporating public
concerns directly into the text of the agreements.

H. Balancing Investors' Rights with Environmental Protection In
International Investment Arbitration
IIAs typically grant foreign investors three main standards of protection:
most-favored nation (MFN) and national treatment, fair and equitable
treatment (FET), and protection against expropriations. The case law
interpreting these three types of provisions and how they relate to
environmental protection will successively be assessed.

A.

STANDARDS OF PROTECTION BY REFERENCE

The first category of cases concern the interface between environmental
concerns and the "like-circumstance" test of HAs' non-discrimination rules.
The two standards of protection by reference, MFN and national treatment,
seek to protect foreign investors by granting them a treatment no less
favorable than the treatment offered to third parties in comparable
situations, either domestic or other foreign investors. In interpreting these
two principles, arbitral tribunals have successfully apprehended
environmental concerns as a criterion to assess whether like-circumstances
existed and whether, as a consequence, the investor's right to a treatment no
less favorable was violated.

2017]

BALANCING INVESTORS' RIGHTS

535

The first case discussed, Parkerings,36 illustrates the influence of
environmental factors in determining whether two situation are similar
under the "like-circumstances" test. The dispute arose from construction of
a parking lot in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, which would have affected
an UNESCO protected site in the city's Old Town.37 The claimant
introduced, inter alia, a claim for discrimination under the LithuaniaNorway BIT's MFN clause, alleging that that the municipality had
authorized a parking project in favor of another foreign investor.38 The
tribunal first recalled with a reference to Pope & Talbot39 that the "essential
condition of the violation of a MFN clause is the existence of a different
treatment accorded to another foreign investor in a similar situation."40 The
tribunal, using a three-tiered test,4 1 eventually rejected the claim on the

ground that the situations of the two investors did not meet the "likecircumstances" test.4 2 The environmental impact of the investment was
crucial in the tribunal's conclusion that discrimination had not occurred:
"The historical and archaeological preservation and environmental
protection could be and in this case were a justification for the refusal of the
project."43
In the UNCITRAL case, S.D. Myers,4 the tribunal used a similar
rationale to resolve a claim under article 1102 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).45 In this case, the export ban of a chemical
substance by the Canadian government, allegedly undertaken to minimize
risk to human health and the environment, affected the U.S. investor's waste
treatment activities.6 The tribunal held that "the interpretation of the
phrase 'like circumstances' in article 1102 must take into account the general
principles that emerge from the legal context of the NAFTA, including both
its concern with the environment and the need to avoid trade distortions
36. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award,
para. 288 (Sept. 11, 2007).
37. Id. at '1385.2.
38. Id. at ' 225.
39. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2,
UNCITRAL at ¶ 78 (Apr. 10, 2001).
40. Parkerings-Compagniet,supra note 36, at $ 369.
41. Id. at $ 371 ("In order to determine whether Parkerings was in like circumstances with Pinus
Proprius, and thus whether the MFN standard has been violated, the Arbitral Tribunal
considers that three conditions should be met: (i) Pinus Proprius must be a foreign investor; (ii)
Pinus Proprius and Parkerings must be in the same economic or business sector; (iii) The two
investors must be treated differently. The difference of treatment must be due to a measure
taken by the State. No policy or purpose behind the said measure must apply to the investment
that justifies the different treatments accorded. A contrario, a less favourable treatment is
acceptable if a State's legitimate objective justifies such different treatment in relation to the
specificity of the investment.").
42. Id. at ¶ 375.
43. Id. at ¶ 392.
44. S. D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, UNCITRAL, at ¶ 252 (Nov. 13, 2000).
45. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, art. 1102.
46. S. D. Myers, supra note 44, at $$ 161-195.
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that are not justified by environmental concerns. The assessment of 'like
circumstances' must also take into account circumstances that would justify
governmental regulations that treat them differently in order to protect the
public interest."47 The tribunal eventually ruled in favor of the U.S.
investor, which, in a similar position to its Canadian counterpart, had
received a less favorable treatment not justified by the specific circumstances
of the case. 48 In doing so, the tribunal solely assessed the like-circumstances
"from the business perspective,"49 without consideration to the actual
environmental situation of the different actors, in sharp contrast with the
tribunal's above-mentioned statement stressing the need to take into
consideration environmental concerns in assessing the like-circumstance
test.
The tribunal in Methanex embraced an even narrower approach, yet
eventually rejecting the claim based on a violation of article 1102 of
NAFFA.5o In this case, a Canadian methanol producer, Methanex,
challenged a Californian measure banning MTBE, a molecule created from
Methanol, arguing that the measure discriminated against foreign methanol
producers in favor of domestic ethanol producers.51 The tribunal concluded
that domestic U.S. producers of ethanol were equally affected by the ban at
issue in Methanex, which prohibited the commercialization of a substance
deemed toxic, thereby concluding that no discrimination occurred without
further consideration to the state's argument on the toxicity of the
substance.52
The Unglaube tribunal also dealt with the articulation between the nondiscrimination principle and environmental concerns,5 3 although in an
"uncommon form."54 The claimant did not directly invoke MNF or
national treatment clauses but rather alleged a violation of article 2.3 of the
Germany-Costa Rica BIT which prohibited the "impairment of the use or
benefits of foreign investments by arbitrary or discriminatory measures."ss
In assessing whether a violation of the treaty provision took place, the
47. Id. at 1 250.
48. Id. at 1 251.
49. Id. ("From the business perspective, it is clear that SDMI and Myers Canada were in "like
circumstances" with Canadian operators such as Chem-Security and Cintec. They all were
engaged in providing PCB waste remediation services. SDMI was in a position to attract
customers that might otherwise have gone to the Canadian operators because it could offer
more favourable prices and because it had extensive experience and credibility. It was precisely
because SDMI was in a position to take business away from its Canadian competitors that
Chem-Security and Cintec lobbied the Minister of the Environment to ban exports when the
U.S. authorities opened the border.").
50. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, at 11 16-19 (Aug. 3, 2005)
(Award), http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/usa/Methanex/MethanexFinalAward.pdf.
51. Id. at pt. 1, 1.
52. Id. at pt. 4, 9.
53. Marion Unglaube and Reinhard Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/1 and ARB/09/20, Award, at 11 224-30 (May 16, 2012).
54. Di BENEDE-ro, supra note 21, at 95.
55. Unglaube, supra note 53, at 1 261.
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tribunal held that the circumstances between the investors were not similar
given the "environmental aim" of the national owner's activity, an
environmental NGO,s6 which was "decisive to the tribunal's refusal to
consider the two contiguous properties to be under comparable
circumstances."s? As a result, the tribunal found that no discrimination
occurred, thereby rejecting a violation of the treaty provision.58
Finally, in a recent and controversial case, Bikon,59 the tribunal initially
embraced the view of the tribunal in Pope & Talbot, according to which a
state could justify an otherwise differential and adverse treatment, even in
the absence of an equivalent of Article XX of the GATT, "to pursue
reasonable and non-discriminatory domestic policy objectives through
appropriate measures even when there is an incidental and reasonably
unavoidable burden on foreign enterprises."60 But after the investor
established a prima facie case of discrimination,6 it failed to justify its
behavior by establishing a connection with an existing "rational government
policy."62 As a consequence, the majority of the tribunal in the Bikon case
found that Canada breached its obligations under NAFTA article 1102.63
Past arbitral cases show mixed results in the consideration of
environmental concerns by arbitral tribunals in assessing the "likecircumstances" test under the MFN or national treatment clauses. As a
consequence, standards of protection by reference will require further
attention in the future. Key environmental concerns, such as the promotion
of renewable energy, biosafety, the regulation of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), and sustainable water management64 could become the
center of gravity of tomorrow's investment protection. As a consequence,
challenges by foreign investors from more traditional sectors seeking the
same levels of protection could multiply. Environmental concerns, when
relevant, must be at the heart of the like-circumstances test in order to
ensure that regulations promoting greener activities are not used as a basis to
56. Id. at 1 264.
57. Di BENEDETrO, supra note 21, at 96.
58. Id.
59. William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and
Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability,
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04 (Mar. 17, 2015).
60. Id. at ¶ 723.
61. Id. at ¶1 685, 695, 724 (The investor argued that its application was evaluated less
favorably, both regarding the mode of review and the evaluative standard, than a number of
Canadian investors in like-circumstances, in relation with other projects involving quarries and
marine terminals in ecologically sensitive zones. Pursuant to local legislation, a Joint Review
Panel had been formed for the ecological assessment of the project; a treatment deemed
"differential and adverse" by the tribunal, which also found that the claimant was in likecircumstances with other domestic investors.).
62. Id. at 1 724.
63. Id. at T 731.
64. Kate Miles, Sustainable Development, National Treatment and Like Circumstances, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAw 278-292 (Marie-Claire Cordonier
Segger et al ed., 2011).
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challenge environmental regulations in the future. Other issues will need to
be clarified, especially the determination of who bears the burden of
establishing that a potentially disparate treatment is nonetheless justified
based on unlike circumstances, as well as the threshold required to make
such a demonstration. The analysis of the tribunal in Bilcon tends to show
that tribunals show little deference to host states' determination that
different products or methods of production are or are not in likecircumstances when applying standards of treatment by reference.65 This
broad discretion left to tribunals in determining whether circumstances are
"like" or not may be problematic in light of the new challenges to
environmental policies that could arise in the future.

B.

FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT

This article now turns to the articulation between environmental concerns
and substantive protection granted to foreign investors in HAs. Foreign
investors can use a broad variety of theories to challenge adverse changes in
environmental regulations.66 While an important part of these claims were
undertaken on the basis of clauses on the protection against expropriation,
the FET standard has also been invoked to obtain compensation for
damages arising from the implementation of an environmental regulation.
This article will not undertake here a review of the notion of FET in
international investment law67 nor cover the situations where stabilization
agreements have been used to improve the predictability of a given investorState relationship.68 The following developments instead focus on the
notion of legitimate expectations amongst the several components of the
FET, in light of its frequent use to challenge adverse changes in
environmental legislation.
Advances in technology and scientific knowledge require a constant
adaptation of a country's environmental laws,. which makes the
interpretation of the FET standard even more critical. A central question
addressed by the tribunals is the determination of the extent to which an
investor's legitimate expectations can be frustrated by the adoption of new
environmental norms. 69 If a tribunal decides that legitimate expectations are
protected under the FET standard, a second issue arises: whether the
investor is entitled to challenge the adoption of the environmental
regulation adverse to the investor's expectations. Typical cases may involve
the withdrawal of permits by an administrative authority motivated by
65. Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability,
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04 (Mar. 17, 2015).
66. VIFRJALES, supra note 27, at 337.
67. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 255-97.
68. VIUEALES, supra note 27, at 339-349. Audley Sheppard & Antony Crockett, Are
Stabilization Clauses a Threat to Sustainable Development?, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 3393-3513 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al ed., 2011).
69. VIITUALES, supra note 27, at 350.
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concerns over pollution. The Tecmedcase, as discussed below, relates to the
non-renewal of a waste landfill permit.70
1.

The Scope of the FET Standard as a Preliminary Question

a.

Within NAFTA

.The first NAFTA awards diverged in their interpretation of article
1105(1) of the NAFTA agreement.7' In S.D. Myers, the tribunal concluded
72
that FET had to be construed as the minimum standard of treatment,
limiting substantially the scope of the standard compared to the broader
interpretation made by other tribunals in a non-NAFTA context.73 Taking a
different position, the tribunal in Pope & Talbot found that article 1105(1) of
NAFTA rather provided a higher standard than customary international
law.74 In reaction to Pope & Talbot, the Free Trade Commnission,
representing NAFTA member states, issued a Note for interpretationwhich
stressed that the FET standard had to be understood in the NAFTA context
as being equivalent to the minimum standard of treatment of international
customary law.75 Following this interpretative note, the Waste Management
tribunal seemed to embrace that view, yet without explicitly referring to
customary international law:
Taken together, the S.D. Myers, Mondev, ADF, and Loewen cases suggest
that the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment
is infringed by conduct attributable to the state and harmful to the
claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust, or
idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or
racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome
which offends judicial propriety-as might be the case with a manifest
failure of natural justice in judicial proceeding of a complete lack of
6
transparency and candour in an administrative process.?

70. T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, $ 41 (May 29, 2003).
71. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 272.
72. S. D. Myers, supra note 44, at $ 252.
73. See, e.g., Tecmed, supra note 70, at $ 154.
74. Pope & Talbot, supra note 39, at ¶ 118.
75. Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTACLAIMS.com (July 31,
2001), http://www.naftalaw.org/comnissionfiles/NAFTA-Comm-1 105_Transparency.pdf.
76. Waste Management Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3,
Award, at ¶ 98 (Apr. 30, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0900.pdf.
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Subsequent tribunals notably held that while the applicable minimum
standard of treatment could evolve,77 the FET standard as stipulated in
NAFTA article 1105 was identical to that minimum international standard.78
As a consequence, it seems unlikely that the FET standard could be used
in the context of the NAFTA agreement to challenge an environmental
regulation on the sole basis that the change in regulation violated the
investor's legitimate expectations. Under the minimum standard of
treatment of customary international law, only a denial of justice, a lack of
due process, a lack of due diligence, and instances of arbitrariness or
discrimination would represent a violation of the minimum standard of
treatment. 79 In other words, the sole implementation of the environmental
measure itself would not constitute a basis to engage the international
responsibility of the state under NAFTA, except in the case of otherwise

77. See, e.g., William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel
Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award
on Jurisdiction and Liability, 1 438 (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw4212.pdf ("At the same time, the international minimum standard exists
and has evolved in the direction of increased investor protection precisely because sovereign
states-the same ones constrained by the standard-have chosen to accept it. States have
concluded that the standard protects their own nationals in other countries and encourages the
inflow of visitors and investment."); International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The
United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 194 (Jan. 26, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0431.pdf ("The content of the minimum standard should
not be rigidly interpreted and it should reflect evolving international customary law.
Notwithstanding the evolution of customary law since decisions such as Neer Claim in 1926, the
threshold for finding a violation of the minimum standard of treatment still remains high, as
illustrated by recent international jurisprudence. For the purposes of the present case, the
Tribunal views acts that would give rise to a breach of the minimum standard of treatment
prescribed by the NAFTA and customary international law as those that, weighed against the
given factual context, amount to a gross denial of justice or manifest arbitrariness falling below
acceptable international standards."); ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, 1 22 (Jan. 9, 2003), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0009.pdf. Contra Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL,
Award, T 22 (June 8, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0378.pdf ("Given the absence of sufficient evidence to establish a change in the custom, the
fundamentals of the Neer standard thus still apply today: to violate the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment codified in Article 1105 of the NAFTA, an act must be
sufficiently egregious and shocking-a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant
unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of
reasons-so as to fall below accepted international standards and constitute a breach of Article
1105(1).").
78. See, e.g., Bikon, supra note 65, at Award on Jurisdiction and Liability ¶¶ 432-33 ("The
Tribunal agrees with Canada on this point. In light of the FTC Notes and in the specific
context of NAFTA Chapter Eleven in which this Tribunal operates, 'fair and equitable
treatment' and 'full protection and security' cannot be regarded as 'autonomous' treaty norms
that impose additional requirements above and beyond what the minimum standard requires.
NAFTA Article 1105 is, then, identical to the minimum international standard.").
79. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 238.
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arbitrary or discriminatory conduct.so A similar conclusion can be made for
recent IIAs which have construed narrowly the scope of the FET standard.
For this reason, this paper will focus on the FET standard as understood in a
broader sense by arbitral tribunals and will focus on cases where such
implementation would constitute by itself a violation by the state of
protection standards.

b.

Outside NAFTA

In a non-NAFTA context, tribunals have generally interpreted FET as
encompassing a wide range of procedural and substantial rights, beyond the
minimum standard of international law in customary international law.81
The elements commonly associated with the FET standard are, in addition
to those included in the minimum standard of treatment: the protection of
legitimate expectations, non-discrimination, transparency and protections
against bad faith, coercion, threats, and harassment.82 The protection of
legitimate expectations has frequently been invoked to challenge regulatory
changes if the intended measures are inconsistent with the state's past
conduct or engagements to the investor. For this .reason, determining
80. In its dissenting opinion in the Bikon case, the arbitrator Donald McRae pointed to the
"remarkable step backward in environmental protection" of the majority's decision. See
William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon
of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada., PCA Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of
Professor Donald McRae, '151 (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw4213.pdf. The tribunal applied the Waste Management standard in
interpreting NAFTA article 1105. Bicon, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability ¶¶ 443-44. The
majority eventually decided that the actions of the panel were arbitrary in that they "'effectively
created, without legal authority or fair notice to Bilcon, a new standard of assessment' rather
than fully carrying out the mandate defined by the applicable law." Id. ¶ 491. This alleged
violation of Canadian domestic law, according to Pr. McRae, should not have amounted to an
arbitrary behavior sufficient to meet the high threshold of Waste Management. See Bikon,
Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald McRae 191 35-36. Such reasoningsubstantially lowers
the threshold required to establish an arbitrary behavior under NAFTA article 1105. In the
words of Pr. McRae, "What the majority has done is add a further control over environmental
review panels. Failure to comply with Canadian law by a review panel now becomes the basis
for a NAFTA claim allowing a claimant to bypass the domestic remedy provided for such a
departure from Canadian law. This is a significant intrusion into domestic jurisdiction and will
create a chill on the operation of environmental review panels." Id. at 1 48.
81. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 238. See, e.g., Compafifa de Aguas del
Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Award, 1 7.4.7 (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0215.pdf ("The Tribunal sees no basis for equating principles of international law with the
minimum standard of treatment."); Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation and Ponderosa
Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 Award, 1 258 (May 22, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf ("It might well be that
in some circumstances where the international minimum standard is sufficiently elaborate and
clear, fair and equitable treatment might be equated with it. But in other more vague
circumstances, the fair and equitable standard may be more precise than its customary
international law forefathers.").
82. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 279.
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whether an environmental meqsure violated an acquired right of the
investor, assuming the doctrine of legitimate expectations is not construed
by the arbitral tribunal as extending beyond acquired rights, is of particular
relevancy.
2.

The Protection of Legitimate Expectations

The scope of the protection of legitimate expectations includes fairness
and due process in decision making as well as "expectations with respect to
the use and benefit of economic rights and interests forming part of the
investment."83 Some tribunals have also included the stability of the legal
and business framework of the host state. 84 Legitimate expectations require
a specific, targeted, and unambiguous conduct by the state,85 and the
investor's reliance must be objectively justifiable and reasonable.86 Tecmed, a
landmark case in the application of this standard, builds on two precedent
awards, Saluka and Spyridon, which adopted a rather permissive position87
regarding the implementation of environmental regulations.8 The case
concerned the denial by the Mexican government to renew the authorization
to operate a waste landfill. The Tribunal found that Mexico violated its
obligation by refusing to renew such permit before the relocation of the
landfill, despite a previous engagement that the relocation would occur only
after the new site was made available. The tribunal embraced a quite
restrictive approach regarding the policy space available to the host state:
[Fair and equitable treatment requires] treatment that does not affect
the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign
investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host
State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may
83. Id. at 280.
84. Unglaube, supra note 53, at 1 248.
85. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 281 (citing Metalclad Corporation v. The
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 91148 (Aug. 30, 2000), https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita05 10.pdf).
86: Id. at 282.
87. Di BENEDETTO, supra note 21, at 106-07.
88. Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶1 304-05
(Mar. 17, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf,
Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, 1 317 (Dec. 7, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0723.pdf ("In order to determine
whether frustration of the foreign investor' expectations was justified and reasonable, the host
State's legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must
enter into consideration as well."); Id. at 1 691 ("The tax regulations which led to the
incriminated decisions were taken by [the Romanian competent authority] in the course of
exercising its obligations to implement the food and safety regulations. Such regulations by a
state reflect a clear and legitimate public purpose. In the Tribunal's view, Claimant may not
have expected that the State would refrain from adopting regulations in the public interest, nor
may Claimant have expected that the Romanian authorities would refrain from implementing
those regulations.").
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know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment
and comply with such regulations. The foreign investor also expects
the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any
preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied
upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and
launch its commercial and business activities.89
A tribunal in Unglaube, a more recent case, 90 adopted a better approach to
balance an investor's right under the FET clause and implementation of
environmental regulations.91 In this case, the claimant alleged a breach of
legitimate expectations, transparency, and due process duties.92 The tribunal
especially held that a considerable measure of deference to state acts should
be accorded when "a valid public policy does exist, and especially where the
action or decision taken relates to the State's responsibility for the
protection of public health, safety, morals, or welfare."93 As noted "[t]his
deference. . . is not without limits."94 According to the tribunal, "[e]ven if
such measures are taken for an important public purpose, governments are
required to use due diligence in the protection of foreigners and will not be
excused from liability if their action has been arbitrary or discriminatory.95
The tribunal eventually rejected the claim because a valid public policy
justified such deference, in the absence of any arbitrary or discriminatory
conduct by the state. 96 An appropriate reasoning should, therefore, seek to
assess the reasonableness of the investor's reliance in light of an existing
public purpose.97 But absent a discriminatory or arbitrary conduct by the
host state, an environmental measure is not likely to constitute a breach of
the standard of legitimate expectations-with the caveat that the standard
applied to determine whether the state's conduct was discriminatory or
arbitrary is left to the arbitral tribunal and should not be characterized too
easily.

3.

Stability and Predictability of the Host Country's Legal Framework

Several tribunals have inferred from the FET clause a duty of states to
insure the stability and predictability of the host country's legal framework.98
89. Tecmed, supra note 70, at 1 154.
90. See, supra note 53, at ¶ 286.
91. Di BENEDETTO, supra note 21, at 114.
92. Marion Unglaube and Reinhard Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, supra note 53, at T 235.
93. Id. at 1 246-47.
94. Id. at ¶ 117.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL supra note 3, at 286.
98. Id.; see, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 276 (May 12, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/fles/casedocuments/itaO84.pdf ("In addition to the specific terms of the Treaty, the significant number
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General legislative acts can constitute a violation of the fair and equitable
treatment if they critically alter the regulatory environment in which the
investment is taking place.99 Where found applicable, the stability and
predictability requirement is not absolute; as stated by the tribunal in
Parkerings, "an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could change,
and thus structure its investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes
of legal environment."'- . Regarding general changes in the regulatory
framework, only an act taken "unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably in the
exercise of its legislative power" will constitute a violation of the FET.'o'
Here again, a relatively high threshold was implemented by the tribunal to
balance the public interest and the investor's protection under the FET
clause, although a significant level of discretion is vested in the arbitral
tribunal in the determination if what is a fair, reasonable, and equitable
exercise of the legislative power of the host state. In addition, a test's result
can be more problematic regarding the adoption and enforcement by the
executive branch of regulations in the field of environmental protection, as
well as decisions of the judicial power, which not only give rise to a greater
number of cases but can often be, because of their own nature, more specific
and targeted than legislative measures.

C.

TiHE

STANDARD OF PROTECTION AGAINST EXPROPRIATION

The implementation by a host country of environmental regulations,
either of a general character such as bans on certain types of products or
targeted bans such as the withdrawal of a license for environmental
concerns, may significantly affect foreign investors' property rights. Arbitral
tribunals have encountered remarkable difficulties in establishing a clear
criteria to draw a distinction between non-compensable regulatory measures
and indirect expropriations. The uncertainty that has resulted, both for
investors and for states, may have explained the recent developments in
treaty practice and the inclusion of more detailed clauses in IAs specifying
the scope of indirect expropriation under the treaty (see infra at 2.4). The
purpose of the current section is to provide an analysis of the arbitral
practice on expropriation cases dealing with environmental concerns. The
of treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, that have dealt with this standard also unequivocally
shows that fair and equitable treatment is inseparable from stability and predictability.").
99. Roland Kliger, 'Fairand Equitable Treatment'and SustainableDevelopment, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAw 237, 248 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger eds.,

Kluwer Law International 2011). See, e.g., LG&E, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital
Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Liability, 1 133 (Oct. 3, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0460.pdf.248. See, e.g., in the context of the Argentine crisis, LG&E, LG&E
Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic
(Decision on Liability, 3 Oct. 2006) ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 [133] (LG&E).
100. Parkerings-Compagniet,supra note 36, at 1371.
101. Id. at 1 332.
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direct and indirect, must be

The EnvironmentalPurpose of the Measure is Irrelevant in the
Qualification of Direct Expropriation

The Santa Elena case, one of the first investment cases with an
environmental component, falls into the first category. 102 Answering a claim
for the direct expropriation of a land to create a wildlife park, the tribunal
stated that "the purpose of protecting the environment for which the
Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which
adequate compensation must be paid. The international source of the
obligation to protect the environment makes no difference." o3 The tribunal
did not challenge the fact that the expropriation was made for public
purposes (and acknowledged this fact as a condition for a lawful
expropriation)'- and was, therefore, "legitimate;"05 however, it did not
excuse the state from its obligation of compensation. The tribunal
concluded: "expropriatory environmental measures-no matter how
laudable and beneficial to society as a whole-are, in this respect, similar to
any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to
implement its policies."106

The Santa Elena award has been pointed as conservativelo7 for the
apparent lack of consideration by the tribunal of the environmental motive
of the expropriation. However, the environmental purpose of the measure
still plays a role in direct expropriation cases to decide lawfulness of the
expropriation, but not at the level of the determination of the expropriation
itself. The impact of the case should not be overestimated as it concerned a
direct expropriation, a situation that is not brought frequently before
investment tribunals.a8

2.

Protecting the Environment as a Public Purpose: an Uncertain
Application in Indirect Expropriation Cases

Concerns about host states' ability to regulate on environmental matters
have crystallized in indirect expropriation cases. Such cases may be divided
102. Compafifa del Desarollo de Santa Elena SA v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB/96/1, Final Award (Feb. 17, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu
ments/italaw6340.pdf.
103. Id. at 1 71.
104. The criteria of a lawful expropriation, often listed in IIAs, require it to be for a public
purpose, made in accordance with due process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and
accompanied with prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL,
supra note 3, at 369.
105. Santa Elena, supra note 102, at $ 71.
106. Id. at $ 72.
107. ANDREAS Kuicx,

GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

236 (Cambridge University Press 2012).
108. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 341.
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into two sub-categories: "regulatory" expropriations, understood as
"substantial deprivation of the value of property resulting from the adoption
of a measure of general application but without formal transfer of title," and
"targeted" expropriations, where the taking result from an "individual and
specific" measure, involving a higher risk of discrimination.-o9 This
distinction is important to determine the potential deterrent effect of the
protection against expropriation on states intending to implement general
environmental regulations.
a.

The Threshold Requirement of a Substantial Deprivation

Key principles can be drawn from the arbitral practice to determine
whether an indirect expropriation took place.11o Andrew Newcombe and
Lluis Paradell have summarized them as follow:
First, the form of the measure is not determinative nor is the intent of
the state. Second, the claimant must establish that the measure in
question results in a substantial deprivation. Third, the character of the
government measures in question must be taken into account in
determining whether a police powers exception applies. Fourth, the
investment-backed legitimate expectations of the investors are relevant
in assessing whether there has been an indirect expropriation. Finally,
the indirect expropriation analysis is context and fact specific.",
The two authors note that in the majority of cases, the deprivation12 is
not substantial enough to be characterized as expropriatory.113 For instance,

in Chemtura, the tribunal rejected the claim that the suspension of the
claimant's authorization to produce and commercialize certain lindane-based
pesticides amounted to an expropriation under NAFTA article 1110, because
the measure "did not amount to a substantial deprivation of the Claimant's
109. ViDUALEs, supra note 27, at 295.
110. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 341.

111. Id.
112. An arbitral tribunal needs first to answer the question of whether the deprivation of a
discrete right is sufficient to qualify as an expropriation or whether a deprivation of the
investment as a whole is required. See, e.g., Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co.
S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award (Apr. 12, 2002), https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0531.pdf (recounting an instance in
which the tribunal considered several claims separately, notably for the deprivation of a license
and a ship, to determine whether an expropriation had occurred with respect of each right); see
also Venezuela Holdings, B.V., et al v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/27, Award, ¶ 286 (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw4011.pdf ("The Tribunal considers that, under international law, a measure
which does not have all the features of a formal expropriation may be equivalent to an
expropriation if it gives rise to an effective deprivation of the investment as a whole. Such a
deprivation requires either a total loss of the investment's value or a total loss of control by the
investor of its investment, both of a permanent nature.").
113. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 357; see id. at 344-45 (providing a list of criteria
established by courts on the requirements for a substantial depravation).
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investment."114 If this factual requirement is met, however, and the claimant
succeed in proving the substantial deprivation and the causality, the burden
shifts to the state to invoke the police powers doctrine, by making "a prima
facie case to justify the regulatory measure as a non-compensatory
measure.""15 States may invoke environmental concerns as a justification
under the police powers exception. But, as demonstrated below, this
doctrine is not applied uniformly by tribunals and tends to be replaced by a
more literal interpretation of the treaty provisions, which limit the role of
the public interest as a condition of the lawfulness of the measure rather than
an exception to the qualification of expropriation. The analysis begins with
a description of several arbitral cases, each embracing a different reasoning
to determine whether a targeted measure constituted an expropriation. A
further analysis of these different approaches will then be undertaken to
provide an analytical framework to assess recent trends in treaty drafting.
b.

Application of the 'Sole Effect' Doctrine: Cases where the
Environmental Purpose of the Measure had Little
Consequences for the Qualification of Indirect
Expropriation

Several arbitral tribunals concluded that the state's targeted environmental
regulation qualified as an indirect expropriation.
Given that no
compensation had been paid by the state, the measure constituted a violation
of the treaty's clause warranting protection against expropriation. In
Metaklad, where the dispute had arisen from the refusal of a permit to build
a waste landfill and the subsequent reclassification of the land as an
ecological preserve by Mexico, the tribunal found that the government's
conduct constituted a violation of the expropriation standard contained in
article 1110 of the NA.FTA.116 It interpreted the provision broadly holding
that under the agreement, indirect expropriation included "covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonablyto-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the
obvious benefit of the host State.""7 The enviromnental dimension of the
case had little impact on the outcome. 118 The tribunal did not give much
weight to the environmental concerns upon which the Mexican government
allegedly based its measure, rather focusing on the sole effect of the measure
on the investment, at the exclusion of any other parameter. 119 But, the
114. Chemrtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, T 265 (Aug. 2,
2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0l49_0.pdf.
115. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 366.
116. See, Metaklad, supra note 85.
117. Id. at 1 103.
118. VusEUALES, supra note 27, at 295.

119. Metaklad, supra note 85 (The Metaklad tribunal emphasized that it "need[ed] not decide or
consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree. Indeed, a finding of
expropriation on the basis of the Ecological Decree is not essential to the Tribunal's finding of a
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tribunal subsequently noted that the municipality had no basis to allege that
the hazardous waste landfill had adverse environmental effects,120 which may
indicate that even if the public policy objective of the measure had been
taken into account, the tribunal would most likely have found no violation
given that the alleged environmental regulation lacked a basis in fact.121
c.

Application of a Proportionality Test: Balancing the Environmental
Purpose of the Measure With the Degree of the Measure's
Interference With The Investor's Right of Use or
Ownership

Facing an analogous scenario, the Tecmed tribunall22 also decided that the
non-renewal of a waste landfill amounted to an indirect expropriation. But,
in so doing, the tribunal did not only take into account the measure's impact
on the investment, but also weighed the legitimate goals pursued by Mexico
in determining whether the measure amounted to an expropriation.123 The
tribunal first underlined that "regulatory actions and measures will not be
excluded from the definition of expropriatory acts."124 It then applied a
proportionality test following an interpretative method drawn from the
European Court of Human Rights' case law.125 Noting that "the economic
and commercial operations in the [1]andfill after such denial [had] been fully
violation of NAFTA article 1110. However, the Tribunal considers that the implementation of
the Ecological Decree would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropriation.").
120. Id. at 1 106.
121. Another series of cases which do not incorporate the public purpose of the measure in the
reasoning of the tribunal must be distinguished: those where the tribunal does not reach the
threshold requirement of substantial deprivation and consequently excludes the qualification of
expropriation without considering the public purpose of the measure. See infra pt. I § A $ 3. In
such cases, this apparent lack of regard is due to the fact that the economic impact of the
measure is not grave enough to qualify as an expropriation in the first place. The NAFTA
tribunal in Glamis Gold found, for instance, that the "severity of the economic impact and the
duration of that impact" did not amount to a regulatory taking because the interference with the
property right was not important enough-without referring to the public purpose of the
measure in its award. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL,
Award, $$ 3 56-66 (June 8, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
0378.pdf.
122. Teemed, supra note 66.
123. Id. at ¶ 122 "Although the analysis starts at the due deference owing to the State when
defining the issues that affect its public policy or the interests of society as a whole, as well as the
actions that will be implemented to protect such values, such situation does not prevent the
Arbitral Tribunal, without thereby questioning such due deference, from examining the actions
of the State in light of Article 5(1) of the Agreement to determine whether such measures are
reasonable with respect to their goals, the deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate
expectations of who suffered such deprivation. There must be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim
sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure."
124. Id.
125. See id. (citingJames and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,
4
19-20 (1986), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita85 .pdf.).
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and irrevocably destroyed"26 as a result of the non-renewal of the permit,
the tribunal eventually qualified the measure as expropriatory.1 27
d.

Application of the Police Powers Doctrine: Deference to the
Environment Purpose of the Measure

Following a different approach, the tribunal in Methanex rejected the
expropriation claim based on the police powers doctrine.128 The claimant
argued that the adoption of the ban by the state of California indirectly
prohibited the investor's product and was tantamount to an expropriation
under article 1110 NAFTA.129 Basing its argument on Metalclad, in which
the tribunal had only considered the economic impact of the measure, the
claimant argued that the regulation was an incidental interference with the
use of property, which had "the effect of depriving [the investor], in whole,
or in significant part, of the use of reasonably-to-be-expected economic
benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State."130 The tribunal did not explicitly refer to the police powers in the
award, but nonetheless decided that "as a matter of general international law,
a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in
accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor
or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then
putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government
would refrain from such regulation."131 The tribunal concluded that "[the]
126. Id. at $ 117. See also LG&E, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E
International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, T
190 (Oct. 3, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0460.pdf ("In
evaluating the degree of the measure's interference with the investor's right of ownership, one
must analyze the measure's economic impact-its interference with the investor's reasonable
expectations-and the measure's duration.").
127. See also AWG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Liability
(July 30, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw6304.pdf
(relating to, and to be red in the context of a concession contract for water distribution and
waste water treatment services.); Id. at ¶ 140 ("In analyzing the measures taken by Argentina to
cope with the crisis, the Tribunal finds that, given the nature of the severe crisis facing the
country, those general measures were within the general police powers of the Argentine State,
and they did not constitute a permanent and substantial deprivation of the Claimants'
investments."). The AWG Group tribunal weighted both the general public powers of the
Argentine state and the impact of the measure on the investment.
128. Methanex, spra note 50.
129. Id. at pt. IV ch. D $ 6. The state of California passed an executive order banning the use
or sale of MTBE, a gasoline additive. Methanex, a Canadian corporation producing and
distributing methanol, an ingredient used in the production of MTBE, argued before the
tribunal that the Californian ban amounted to an expropriation in violation of article 1110 of
NAFTA (as well as a violation of FET in violation of article 1105 of NAFTA and a denial of
national treatment in violation of article 1102 of NAFTA). Id. at pt. I 1 2, 4.
130. Id. at ¶ 4.
131. Id. at ¶ 7.
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ban was a lawful regulation and not an expropriation."132 The police power

was applied as an exception to the general rule that a substantial deprivation
of the investor's property qualifies as an expropriation.]33
The Methanex tribunal was highly deferential to the host state's public
interest. Its reasoning, in that regard, may be seen as unsatisfactory. First,
unlike in Tecmed, the Methanex tribunal showed no consideration to the
impact of the regulation on the investment, thereby turning the exception
into a principle, in sharp contrast with a common view in investment law to
assess the impact of the measure on investor's rights first.134 In comparison,
the Saluka tribunal which also embraced the police power doctrine, took a
more balanced position.s35 After noting that the measure "had the effect of
eviscerating [Saluka's] investment,"136 the tribunal applied the police powers
exceptions to "neutralize" the qualification of expropriation.137
Second, the Methanex award did not follow the elements of the definition
of a lawful expropriation contained in article 1110 NAFTA.138 Instead of
acknowledging the lack of compensation, which should have characterized
the expropriation as unlawful under article 1110, and then using the police
powers doctrine to determine whether the expropriation could have been
justified given its environmental purpose under a traditional application of
the police powers, the tribunal disregarded the condition of adequate
compensation. It concluded that because the three other conditions were
fulfilled (public purpose, non-discrimination, and due process), no
expropriation occurred in the first place.139 The tribunal, by doing so,
applied the conditions of a lawful expropriation to identify whether the
expropriation could be justified after having been qualified as such.-o The
132. Id. at $ 15.
133. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America., UNCITRAL, Final Award of the
Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, pt. 4 ch. D (Aug. 3, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf.
134. ARNAUD DE NANrEUIL, L'EXPROPRIATION INDIRECTE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE
L'INvESTISSEmENT 484-85 (Pedone 2014). See also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, Supra note 3, at
366.
135. Saluka, supra note 88, at J¶ 304-05.
136. Id. at ¶ 276.
137. DE NANTEUIL, supra note 134, at 489.

&

138. North America Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
605, art. 1110 (1993) ("No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ('expropriation'), except:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

for a public purpose;
on a non-discriminatory basis;
in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.").

139. DE NANTEUIL, supra note 134, at 489.

140. Id. at 490.
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Saluka tribunal replaced thereafter the police powers doctrine in the role of
an exception mechanism.141
Third, the Methanex tribunal, in concluding that the measure was a lawful
regulation and not an expropriation, disregarded the fact that a regulation
can be a lawful measure under the IIA and an indirect expropriation at the
same time, or in other words, that a measure can (i) result in a substantial
deprivation of the investment, giving rise to an indirect expropriation claim
and (ii) be non-discriminatory, taken for a public purpose and with due
process, thus, remaining lawful under the relevant treaty provision.142 By
creating this distinction, the tribunal overlooked the key issue at stake, which
was the determination of a standard achieving an appropriate balance
between both investors' rights and states' inherent power to regulate on
environmental matters.
More recently, the Chemtura tribunal further elaborated on the police
powers as an exception mechanism to the qualification of expropriation.
The Chemtura tribunal found that the targeted measure did not amount to a
substantial deprivation and denied the claim of indirect expropriation.
Despite this initial finding, the tribunal subsequently turned to the state's
police power defense argument, as if it was an additional principle that could
exclude the qualification of an indirect expropriation in the first place.143 In
doing so, the tribunal in Chemtura embraced Methanex's inverted reasoning:
Irrespective of the existence of a contractual deprivation, the Tribunal
considers in any event that the measures challenged by the Claimant
constituted a valid exercise of the Respondent's police powers. As
discussed in detail in connection with Article 1105 of NAFTA, the
[governmental agency] took measures within its mandate, in a nondiscriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing awareness of the
dangers presented by lindane for human health and the environment. A
measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid exercise of the
State's police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an
expropriation.1 4
Applying the police powers after having established the existence of a
substantial deprivation, as in Chemtura, or ex ante as a carve-out, without
consideration to the impact of the measure on the investor's rights as in
Methanex arguably does not change the outcome. The tribunal concluded,
in both cases, that no expropriation had occurred. But, assessing the impact
of the measure on the investment, before turning secondly to the police
powers, is important as a matter of accuracy for legal reasoning. When a
tribunal, as in Methanex and Chemtura, states that the measure is nondiscriminatory, motivated by public policy and with due process,
representing as a consequence a valid exercise of its police powers, it is in
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. at 488.
See VnuALEs, supra note 27, at 295.
Chemtura, supra note 114, at l 266 (emphasis added).
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reality providing the qualification of a lawful expropriation. Assessing these
conditions as criteria for the absence of expropriation is not a correct
application of the IIAs provisions. For these reasons, the application of the
police powers in Chemtura is more balanced in the sense that it follows this
two-step analysis; yet, it remains accurate in light of how HAs formulate the
three criteria of non-discrimination, public purpose, and due process as
criteria of lawful expropriation and not as criteria to determine whether an
expropriation even existed, as followed by the tribunal in Chemtura.
The reasoning consists in first assessing whether a substantial deprivation
occurred and then deciding, if this is the case, whether the expropriation is
lawful pursuant to the treaty provision, is arguably less favorable to host
states, given that the police powers is not applied to exclude the qualification
of an indirect expropriation in its entirety. For this reason, it may not be
optimal from a public policy perspective, given that this approach would give
rise to a duty to compensate in any situation where the environmental
regulation amounted to a substantial deprivation of the investment. Policy
concerns may, therefore, require tribunals to shift away from a black or
white application of the police powers and embrace a proportionality test,
consisting in taking into account, concomitantly, the level of impact on the
investment, and the public purpose of the measure, at the same stage of the
reasoning. Such approach may give rise to additional challenges, such as
increasing the unpredictability of the tribunal's ultimate decision or vesting
too much deference in the tribunal itself. These concerns are addressed in
the following section.
3.

Towards a More Balanced Application of the Police Powers in Recent
Indirect Expropriation Cases

a.

The Unsatisfactory Application of the Police Powers Doctrine to
Exempt the Host State from any Duty of Compensation

Considered together, Methanex and Chemtura seem to imply a stronger
deference by NAFTA investment tribunals to the state's regulatory powers
in the context of indirect expropriations. But, the treaty's provisions on
expropriation do not provide an express basis to use the police. powers in
order to exclude the qualification of expropriation ex ante (by opposition to
justifying ex post the behavior of the state as a lawful expropriation still
requiring the payment of compensation).
The recourse to the notion of police powers crystallizes the difficulties
that face tribunals seeking to draw a line between the concept of indirect
expropriation and governmental regulatory measures not requiring
compensation.145 On the one hand, the tribunal's extensive application of
the notion of police powers in Methanex could grant states too much leeway,
145. "IndirectExpropriation"and the "Right to Regulate" in InternationalInvestment Law: OECD
Working Papers on InternationalInvestment 2004/04, OECD (Sept. 2004), https://www.oecd.org/
daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_4.pdf.
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by enabling them to implement general measures which, despite
substantially depriving the investor of its property rights, would not be
expropriations under the IIA and therefore would not require compensation.
On the other hand, the application in indirect expropriation cases of the
traditional test used for direct expropriations-(i) whether a substantial
deprivation occurred and (ii) whether the measure was taken for a public
purpose, in accordance with due process of law, in an non-discriminatory
manner and with prompt, adequate and effective compensation (i.e. whether
the expropriation was law under the IIA)-may prove unsatisfactory. If this
test was applied as such by tribunals in indirect expropriation cases, a
legitimate environmental measure substantially depriving the investor would
automatically be qualified as unlawful, given that no compensation would
have been paid by the state. The latter, by definition, would have challenged
the qualification of expropriation at the first place and, therefore, the
hypothesis of a pre-emptive payment seems highly unlikely.146 Such
approach would increase the cost of implementing environmental measures,
if the qualification of expropriation is automatically found every time a
substantial deprivation occurred. This theory has been referred to as the
"sole effect" doctrine. Only the effect of the measure on the investment can
be considered in order to determine whether compensation was due. The
purpose of the regulation is only taken into account at the stage of the
determination of the lawfulness of the expropriation, in answering the
question of whether the expropriatory measure was taken for a "public
purpose" or for the "public interest," amongst the other requirements
provided by the treaty.
b.

The Threshold Requirement of a Substantial Deprivation as a
Safeguard to the Application of the Sole Effect Doctrine to
Challenges Against General Regulatory Measures

The application of the "sole effect" doctrine to environmental measures
seems inappropriate, given that it in fact requires the tribunals to make the
determination that the measure is either a valid act or an unlawful
expropriation, which could in turn increase the costs of environmental
protection and act as a deterrent. But, the distinction between lawful
regulatory measures and unlawful indirect expropriation cases is not as sharp
at it appears. Past awards show that the requirement of substantial
deprivation is a high standard to meet.1 47 A mere decrease in value or
profitability due to a state measure would not rise to the level of an
146. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Exploration: UNCTAD Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements II, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7 (Sept. 2004),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7-en.pdf.
147. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award,
1 96 (June 26, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0674.pdf;
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, $ 150 (Sept.
13, 2001), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0178.pdf.
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expropriation]48-although other grounds, e.g., the FET standard, may be
available. Therefore, in expropriation cases brought by investors to
challenge general environmental regulations, the requirement of a
substantial deprivation represents an important obstacle to the qualification
of indirect expropriation. This threshold is an important safeguard to avoid
excessive claims preventing states from implementing general regulatory
measures.149 In such cases, absent bad faith, discrimination, or a gross
disproportion to the investor's right and expectations,5o the general rule
seems to be that the investor would not be founded in claiming
compensation.
Changes in the environmental legal framework of a state are not
exceptional,51 even if no arbitration awards dealing with general regulatory
changes and expropriation claims are available to provide guidance.152 But
this outcome is different when the investor has received specific assurances
from the host country. Although the legitimate expectations were already
studied as a component of the FET, they also play a role in assessing
whether the government measure was expropriatory.153 Although they
cannot be a substitute for the lack of substantial deprivation, they may come
into play after such a determination. In cases involving general regulatory
148. In Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del
Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, outside the context of NAFTA, the tribunal ruled that no
substantial deprivation occurred-and that as a consequence, Argentina's conduct did not
breach the expropriation clause of the BIT. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona
S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case

No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, 1 145 (July 30, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0813.pdf. As a consequence of such qualification, the tribunal
did not need to answer Argentina's argument that the police powers exception applied to the
case. However, the tribunal did answer Argentina's argument that the police power exception
should also apply to full protection and security and FET violations and answered negatively to
both, judging that "the application of the police powers doctrine as an explicit, affirmative
defense to treaty claims other than for expropriation is inappropriate, because in judging those
claims and applying such principles as full protection and security and fair and equitable
treatment, . . . a tribunal must take account of a State's reasonable right to regulate. ... Thus, if
a tribunal finds that a State has violated treaty standards of fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security, it must of necessity have determined that such State has exceeded its
reasonable right to regulate.... In short, a decision on the application of the police powers
doctrine in such circumstance would be duplicative and therefore inappropriate." Id. at T 148.
Regarding the expropriation claim, the tribunal decided that the targeted measure (the refusal
of an Argentine province to revise water tariffs under a concession contract, which was
eventually terminated unilaterally by the province due to allegedly high nitrate levels) did not
cause a substantial deprivation. The tribunal's implicitly confirmed a conception of the police
powers as an exception mechanism and not a principle applying without a first assessment of the
impact of the measure on the investment to determine whether an expropriation occurred in the
first place. Id.
149. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 357.
150. Id. at 366. See also VISRUALES, supra note 27, at 305-15.
151. See VIFTuALs, supra note 27, at 307.
152. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 361.

153. Id. at 350.
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measures however, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a host
country would commit to the investor not to undertake non-discriminatory
regulations.154 In MTD,ss the tribunal embraced a critical view, recalling
that "BITs are not an insurance against business risk."156 The claimant
argued that it was indirectly expropriated and after receiving authorization
from the state to conduct its investment, claimant was then denied a permit
based on zoning requirements.157 The tribunal stressed that granting the
permit would have required Chile, the host state, to change its zoning laws,
which was not a right available under the BIT.158 It followed the view that
investors are required to assess the regulatory environment of the country in
which they invest and calculate the commercial right accordingly.159 In
Methanex, the tribunal also mentioned the respect of past specific
commitments as a limitation to the police powers doctrine.
c.

Reconciling the Arbitral Practice on Challenges Against
Environmental Measures

The incoherence arising from the arbitral practice is problematic. If one
considers that the Methanex award was based on a "misinterpretation" of
NAFTA article 1110, the threat to environmental policy making posed by
the Metalclad case160 could.surface again given the latitude afforded to each
tribunal in interpreting the notion of expropriation. We touch here on the
reasons why a more predictable framework would be helpful, not only within
the NAFTA framework,161 but in international investment law in general to
provide the actors of international investment law with more coherence in
the qualification of indirect expropriation. A balanced approach seems
preferable to enable tribunals to weigh both interests at stake, i.e., the
impact on investors' rights and the purpose of the measure. Within a
proportionality analysis, the police power doctrine could be considered as a
factor, rather than as a rigid exception mechanism.
Several trends can be identified from this overview of the arbitration
practice concerning the three traditional standards granted in IIAs. First, it
can be concluded that most tribunals took into account the environmental
purpose of host state's measures in their interpretation of HAs' provisions.
Despite an apparent homogeneity, each case involves different claims and
distinct sets of facts, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions for future
environmental cases.
154. See DE NANTEUIL, supra note 134, at 491.

155. MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Rep. of Chile, Award (May 25, 2004),
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7.
156. Id. at 9 178.
157. Id. at ¶ 207.
158. Id. at ¶ 214.
159. VIFUALES, supra note 27, at 302.
160. Joshua Elcombe, Regulatoy powers vs. investment protection under NAFTA's Chapter 1110:
Metaklad, Methanex, and Glamis Gold, 8 UNv. or TORONTO FAC. OF L. REv. 71 (2010).

161. See id. at 92-98.
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Second, most of the rules of interpretation identified by the arbitral
tribunals are internal, in the sense that they follow "the internal
interpretative canons of [international investment law], that is, the canons
which look at the ordinary meaning of applicable rules and-in the context
of [international investment law]-do not in themselves involve taking into
account values and interests other than property-related and commercial
ones."162 External legal elements, such as environmental obligations set out
by other treaties,163 have been largely ignored by the arbitration practice due
to the limited mandate of arbitration tribunals,164 despite the open door
provided by Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention, which provide that
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties-here, to a given IIA-are part of the context of a given agreement
and should therefore be recognized a role as interpretative tools of HAs
provisions.
Third, the several approaches followed by tribunals remain unsatisfactory.
The analysis usually starts with an assessment of the impact of the measure
on the investment, i.e., whether a substantial deprivation took place. The
police powers exception, when applied, provides states with a powerful
defense mechanism,165 but its heterogeneous application by arbitral tribunals
creates uncertainty. The application of the police powers exception is also
problematic given that it largely overlooks the impact of the measure on the
investor's rights. Substantial deprivations of the investor's rights provoked
by environmental measures of the host state should not be assessed through
a black or white prism-the same remark being also applicable to the
analysis undertaken by the Metaklad tribunal which only considered the
effect on the investor's property to assess the expropriatory nature of the
measure. Potentially every regulatory measure is taken for a public purpose,
so a mere statement that a measure promotes the public interest should
automatically waive the state's obligation to compensate. The tribunal in
Vivendi expressed this concern: "If public purpose automatically immunises
the measure from being found to be expropriatory, then there would never
be a compensable taking for a public purpose."'66 The lawfulness of an
expropriation must therefore be distinguished from the qualification of
expropriation, which triggers a duty to compensate. Tribunals have, over the
years, provided legal tools to assess whether an indirect expropriation
occurred and whether compensation was due. Yet, solving the legitimacy
crisis of international investment law requires all actors of economic
162. Di BENEDErrO, supra note 21, at 132.
163. Id. at 84.
164. See Chemtura, supra note 114, at 1 137 (The tribunal considered the international
commitments of the state (its international obligations under the Aarhus Protocol to the
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution) in justifying the exercise of
environmental regulatory powers, even if it conflicted with the FET obligations under
NAFTA.). See also Di BENEDETTO, supra note 21, at 144 (Those international obligations were
not used in the interpretation of the FET standard.).
165. DE NANTEUIL, supra note 134, at 490.

166. VIvENDi, supra note 81, § 7.5.21. See also DE NANTEULT

supra note 134, at 496.
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development to be provided with a coherent, balanced, and sustainable
framework. States should be able to implement legitimate nondiscriminatory environmental measures without the threat of having their
regulations challenged every time they impact the economic interests of
foreign investors. For these reasons, states have increasingly inserted in HAs
provisions which seek to preserve policy space, especially in the field of
environmental protection. They include preambular language to provide
guidance to tribunals when interpreting treaty provisions, general exception
clauses, and language clarifications excluding ex ante certain measures from
the scope of a given provision or the treaty as a whole. It is to these
provisions that this paper now turns.

III. An Assessment of New Trends in Treaty Drafting: Towards
a Balanced Approach Between Investors' Rights and Host
States' Ability to Regulate?
The protection of the environment has served as a training ground for
innovative treaty drafting in the field of international investment law. New
types of provisions are introduced in HAs with the intent to balance host
states' public interest with traditional investors' rights. Several authors have
provided an analysis of this recent trend,167 but an assessment of the
potential implications of these environmental provisions on treaty
arbitration remains to be undertaken, building on the arbitral practice.
What methods and theories have arbitral tribunals used to protect legitimate
environmental concerns applying IIAs that did not contain these new
provisions? What lessons can be drawn from these cases? At the same time,
investment arbitration should not be the sole focus. It is also necessary to
assess, from a broader perspective, whether these new trends could help
solve the current legitimacy crisis which faces international investment law
today. In the first part, we discussed how tribunals interpreted the
substantive protection granted in IIAs to foreign investors and investments
in a way that preserved a certain level of host states' policy space, yet
concomitantly failing to provide both host states and foreign investors with
coherence in treaty interpretation. We now turn to the assessment of the
latest trends in treaty drafting with a specific focus on environmental
concerns.
167. See, e.g., Christina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Going green: Managing the
environment through internationalinvestment arbitration,30 As. U. INT'L L. REv. 383 (2015); Di
BENEDETTO, supra note 21; KULICK, supra note 107; Markus W. Gehring & Avidan Kent,
Sustainable development and HIAs, from Objective to Practice, in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTs 284 (Armand de Mestral & C6line Ldvesque eds. 2013);
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INvETMENT LAw 351-70 (Marie-Claire Cordonier
Segger, Markus W Gehring, & Andrew Newcombe & Paradell eds. 2011); Suzanne A. Spears,

Making way for the public interest in international investment agreements, in EVOLUTION IN
INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 275-94 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds.
2011); VIRUALES, supra note 27.
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The OECD, in its survey of environmental provisions in IIAs (2012),
noted that only eight percent of IIAs contained a reference to the
environment.1 68 This phenomenon can be explained by the historical
purpose of investment agreements, the protection of investors from capital
exporting countries when investing in the developing world, but also by a
certain disinterest of the international development community toward
environmental concerns.1 69 The OECD survey shows that the overall
number of HAs which contain environmental language is now expanding.
While such language was infrequent until the mid-1990s,170 the proportion
of newly concluded IIAs with a reference to environmental matters increased
significantly, with a peak of eighty-nine percent in 2008.17, The authors of

the survey also note that such an occurrence is more frequent in investment
chapters contained in free trade agreements (FTAs).172 More recently, the
database on IIA provisions published by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) confirms the growing share of recently
negotiated HAs which includes a reference to environmental concerns or the
state parties' right to regulate.173 Yet, only a minority of IIAs, even amongst
those signed in 2015 and 2016, contain a reference to environmental
concerns.
The concern to preserve sufficient policy space in FTAs can be explained
by their coverage of a broader set of issues and by the increasing focus placed
by the international trade framework on the environment, which has become
168. Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 5.
169. Diepeveen, et al., supra note 17, at 148.

170. Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 8.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 7.
173. UNCTAD's "HA Mapping Project" sets out to create a comprehensive database of
International Investment Agreements (HA). As part of the Project, students from more than
twenty universities have participated in a mapping exercise to list more than 150 variations of
IIA provisions and incorporate them into an "International Investment Agreements Navigator."
As of November 22nd, 2016, the provisions of 1949 BITs and investment chapters of FTAs had
been referenced. Amongst the treaties already mapped, twenty-six (including seven FTAs)
contained a preambular reference to the state's right to regulate; fifty-four contained a
preambular reference to sustainable development (including ten FTAs), with a share largely
growing in the past six years, with forty-four references in HAs signed after 2010, compared to
ten before 2010; 114 contained a preambular reference to environmental aspects more generally

(including sixteen FTAs), with forty-six references in IIAs signed since 2010; 108 HAs contained
a clause mentioning the state's right to regulate in the text of the treaty (including eighteen
FTAs), twenty-nine HAs contained a reference to corporate social responsibility (including ten
FTAs), with twenty-six occurrences in treaties signed after 2010, compared to only three before
2010; 238 IAs contained a clause mentioning health and environment concerns in the text of
the treaty except the preamble (including thirty-two investment chapters of FTAs); 108
contained a clause mentioning the state's right to regulate in text treaty (including eighteen
investment chapters of FTAs); ninety-six IAs contained a "not lowering standards" type of
provision (including twenty-two investment chapters of FTAs); 180 IAs contained a general
public policy exception clause including health and environmental concerns, (including twentyeight investment chapters of FTAs). More details available online at <http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent#iialnnerMenu>.
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a "mainstream trade issue."174 Future developments in IIA drafting will
reveal if the gap between FTAs and BITs drafting tends to narrow. It would
indicate that the increasing occurrence of environmental provisions in IIAs
can be explained by the shift of international investment law towards a more
balanced approach between investors' rights and states' ability to regulate,
rather than the mere consequential impact of the inclusion of investment
chapters within FTAs which require reading an investment chapter in
conjunction with other environmental references within a given FTA (such
as preamble and general exceptions).
A.

PREAMBULAR

1.

Typology of PreambularRefirences to the Environment

REFERENCES

Preambular language is one of the most frequently observed categories of
environmental clauses identified by the OECD in its survey. 75 A broad
range of concerns have been included in IIAs' preambles: references to the
concept of sustainable development or to other international environmental
agreements,1 76 affirmations that the promotion of foreign investments
should not be undertaken at the expense of the environment by lowering
environmental standards, etc. Overall, the number of IIAs that contain
preambular language on environmental matters remain limited.177 But states
increasingly include environmental concerns in their Model BIT's

174. Steve Charnovitz, The WTO's EnvironmentalProgress 10 JOURNAL OF INT'L EcoN. L. 685,
687 (2007) (Amongst the most significant landmarks of this "greening" of international trade
law was the inclusion in the preamble of WTO agreement of the notion of sustainable
development, which led the compliance panel in the US-Shrimp case to incorporate sustainable

development as part of the objectives of the WTO agreement). See Panel Report, United States
- Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products- Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia, § 5.54 WT/DS58/RW, (June 15, 2001).
175. Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 11 (explaining that preambular language was the second
most frequently observed type of provisions in their 2012 study, appearing in sixty-six HAs and
two model BITs within the sample).
176. Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 13.
177. Id. at 11 (only sixty-six IIAs out of a sample of 1,623 TIAs contained preambular language
on environmental concerns).
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preambles,s78 an encouraging sign given the role of Model BITs as references
in the negotiating process.179
a.

Reconciling the Protection and Promotion of Foreign Investments
with Environmental Protection and Conservation

An important share of environmental preambular references attempt to
reconcile the stated objective of IIAs to promote and protect international
investments with environmental protection and conservation.180 The
NAFTA preamble, for instance, contains the following sentence: "Undertake
each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environmental protection
and conservation; . . . strengthen the development and enforcement of

environmental regulation."81 The preamble of numerous HAs, notably
signed by China, Finland, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the
United States, express similar concerns with some variations in the
wording.182

b.

Not Lowering Environmental Standards

Another sample of preambular references express a concern regarding the
lowering of environmental standards to attract foreign investment. Finland,
the Netherlands, and the United States included such provisions in their
Model BITs. Finland's Model BIT reads as follows: "AGREEING that these
objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental
measures of general application. . . ."1s3 The Netherland's 2004 Model BIT

contains the following language: "Considering that these objectives can be
achieved without compromising health, safety and environmental measures
of general application."184 These two draft provisions have been
incorporated in subsequent ILAs.185
178. Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ (last visited

June 29, 2017).

Amongst the Model BITs drafted in the 2000s available on UNCTAD's

investment treaty database:
- Model BITs which do not contain a reference to the environment or sustainable

development: Denmark (2000), Peru (2000), Greece (2001), Mauritius (2002), Uganda
(2003), Kenya (2003), Guatemala (2003), Italy (2003), France (2006), Colombia (2011),
Germany (2008), Ghana (2008), Mexico (2008), the United Kingdom (2008).
- Model BITs which do contain at least one reference to the protection of the environment

or sustainable development: Finland (2001), the Netherlands (2004), Canada (2004),
Turkey (2009), Guatemala (2010), Austria (2010), the United States (2012), the Southern
African Development Community (2012), Norway (2015), India (2015), and Brazil (2015).
179. See id. (the similarities between Brazil's Model BIT and recently negotiated treaties such as

the Brazil-Chile BIT (2015)).
180. Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 13.
181. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 45, at pmbl.
182. See Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 12, for a broader sample of preambular references.
183. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of
[Country] on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 2001.
184. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between
[Country] and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Mar. 2004.

185. See Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 27-32.
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Climate Change

Newly signed FTAs containing an investment chapter often feature more
precise preambular language than BITs, given the larger scope of these
agreements. The ETA between Japan and Switzerland illustrates this point,
with an unusual reference to climate change: "DETERMINED, in
implementing this Agreement, to seek to preserve and protect the
environment, to promote the optimal use of natural resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development and to adequately address the
challenges of climate change."186

d.

Sustainable Development

Many IIAs provide in their preamble for a reference to the concept of
sustainable development. The preamble of the NAFTA stipulates that
Canada, Mexico, and the United States are resolved to "PROMOTE
sustainable development."87 The Australia-Chile FTA, which contains an
investment chapter, stipulates in its preamble that the two countries are
"resolved to ... IMPLEMENT this Agreement in a manner consistent with
sustainable development and environmental protection and conservation.",s8
Norway's 2015 Model BIT189 is investment-oriented, with a reference to the
need for sustainable investments:

.

Desiring to strengthen their economic and investment relations in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development in its
economic, social and environmental dimensions, and to promote
investment in a manner aiming at high levels of environmental . .
protection in accordance with relevant internationally recognized
standards and agreements in these fields to which they are parties.
Desiring to contribute to a stable framework for investment in order to

186. Agreement on Free Trade and Economic Partnership Between Japan and the Swiss
Confederation, Japan-Switz., Sept. 1, 2009.
187. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 45.
188. Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Chile, July 30, 2008.
189. Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and [Country] for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, May 30, 2015 (The provisions of Norway's 2015 Model BIT have
not been inserted in an actual BIT, yet Norway's most recent BIT was ratified in 1994.
Amongst the fourteen BITs ratified by Norway still in force as listed on UNCTAD's website,
none contained a reference to environment, not including other IAs such as the European
Charter and IIAs signed between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries and
third parties. The interruption in the ratification of BITs was allegedly due to "issues associated
with the relationship between the Norwegian Constitution and the agreements' provisions
concerning investor-state arbitration and compensation for expropriation." Comments on the
Model for Future Investment Agreements, http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUR5850/
tekster/norway-draft model bitcomments.pdf (last visited June 29, 2017). The Norway 2007
Model BIT nonetheless contained similar preambular language. It was withdrawn in 2009). See
Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway shelves its draft model bilateral investment treaty, (June 8, 2009),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/06/08/norway-shelves-its-proposed-model-bilateral-investmenttreaty/.
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maximize effective and sustainable utilization of economic resources
and improve living standards.190
Norway's Model BIT's preamble also contains a reference to corporate
social responsibility.191
These references illustrate that the concept of sustainable development is
increasingly penetrating the international investment legal framework.192
The important number of contributions on the topic and the evolving
definition of sustainable development make it difficult to determine the
precise role played by the notion within the international investment law
framework. The reference to sustainable development in preambles could
provide arbitrators with useful guidance to balance investors' rights with
public policy concerns. But sustainable development remains a malleable
notion that can serve as an argument to defend environmental regulation as
well as increasing FDI flows, especially when they concern sectors such as
renewable energy, use and distribution of resources, etc. Sole references to
sustainable development could, therefore, be used as arguments for proinvestor interpretations of the notion, read in conjunction with the object
and purpose of IAs to protect foreign investors and their investments.193
e.

References to Other International Agreements

A few IAs contain a reference to international environmental agreements
in their preamble. These references must be distinguished from provisions
in the actual text of the IIA. This second type of clause incorporates, by
reference in the text of the agreement, obligations arising from other
international agreements. These clauses tend to be more specific and
obligation-driven, but they are also very uncommon. 194 Amongst
preambular references, the preamble of the Energy Charter Treaty contains
extensive environmental language, which can be explained by the nature and
goals of the Energy Charter Treaty:
Recalling the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
and its protocols, and other international environmental agreements
with energy-related aspects; and . . . recognizing the increasingly urgent
190. Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and [Country] for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments 1-2, May 30, 2015.
191. Id. at 2 (It reads as follows: Emphasising the importance of corporate social responsibility).
192. See Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, UNCTAD (2015), http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb20l5d5_en.pdf. See generally Cordonier et. al., supra
note 4.
193. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 114.
194. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the one
hand, and the Republic of Tajitistan, on the other hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments art. 5.3, Belg.-Lux.-Taj., Feb. 12, 2009 ((signed in 2009 but not yet
entered in force): "The Contracting Parties reaffirm their commitments under the international
environmental agreements, which they have accepted. They shall strive to ensure that such
commitments are fully recognised and implemented by their domestic legislation.").
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need for measures to protect the environment, including the
decommissioning of energy installations and waste disposal, and for
internationally-agreed objectives and criteria for these purposes. 19 5
Norway's Model BIT also contains a reference to other international
instruments: "Recognizing that the provisions of this agreement and
provisions of international agreements relating to the environment shall be
interpreted in a mutually supportive manner."196
Preambular references to international environmental agreements,
however, could be useful to foster a harmonized reading of the different
states' international obligations and promote more coherence within the
different fields of international law. The tribunal's interpretation in S.D.
Myers tends to support such a finding. The tribunal took into account
Canada's obligations arising under the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, to
determine whether Canada's environmental measure pursued a legitimate
goal consistent with the policy objectives of the Convention.197 This
decision arose in the specific context of NAFTA, which expressly recognizes
the primacy of the Basel Convention in its article 104 "Relation to
Environmental and Conservation Agreements," upon ratification by all
NAFTA parties.198 The tribunal, after stressing that Canada but not the
United States ratified the Convention,99 acknowledged that its provisions
could not prevail over the NAFTA.200 Nonetheless, the tribunal gave weight
to the Convention in assessing whether Canada violated its obligations
under the NAFTA. Such position is consistent with NAFTA's preamble,
which states that the parties seek, inter alia, to "strengthen the development
and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations," even if the tribunal
did not explicitly refer to it when discussing the NAFTA preamble.201
2.

The Limited Role of Preambles in the Interpretationof IIAs' Substantial
Standards

Preambular language traditionally plays an important role in treaty
interpretation202 as part of the context of a given provision.203 Preambles do
195. Energy Charter Treaty pmbl., Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 UNTS 95.
196. Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and [Country] for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, supra note 190, at 2.
197. S.D. Myers, supra, note 44, at $ 255.
198. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 45, at art. 104.
199. See supra note 190, at ¶ 210.
200. Id. at $ 214-5.
201. Id. at $ 196.
202. Ortino, supra note 18, at 246.
203. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), signed May 23, 1969, 155
UNTS 331 art 3 1(1) & (2) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (provides the following rule of
interpretation:
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not contain obligations for the parties,204 which makes their inclusion
relatively costless.205 The interpretative role of IIAs' preambles, as any other
international agreement in general, should not be minimized.206 They
should fulfill a major interpretative function in determining the legal
significance of each IAs' provision.207 The interpretation of IAs' broad,
substantive standards has divided arbitral tribunals, as well as the articulation
of these notions with public policy concerns. The Vienna Convention
supports the interpretative role of treaty preambles, including IIAs. It is
doubtful that HAs' preambles play such a role in practice. Most tribunals
have acknowledged the interpretative function of preambles,208 but their
impact has been limited due to tribunals' restrictive interpretation. Some
tribunals even expressed caution against giving too much weight to
preambular language.209
"1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes. . . .").
204. See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Rep. of Pak., ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, 1 230, (Aug. 27, 2009) ("It is doubtful that in the absence of a
specific provision in the BIT itself, the sole text of the preamble constitutes a sufficient basis for
a self-standing fair and equitable treatment obligation under the BIT.").
205. See Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 5 (Despite this apparent flexibility, only a minority
of IIAs' preamble contain an explicit reference to environmental concerns.).
206. Alschner & Tuerk, supra note 19, at 202.
207. Beharry & Kuritzky, supra note 167, at 389.
208. See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 290
(Aug. 27, 2009) (In a case non-related to the environment, with no environmental language in
the BIT's preamble: "As expressed in the Treaty preamble, it is the intention of the State parties
to intensify their economic cooperation, and their purpose to create favorable conditions for the
investments of the nationals of a party in the territory of the other, while recognizing that the
promotion and protection of such investments by means of a treaty may serve to stimulate
private initiative and improve the well-being of both peoples. It follows from the ordinary
meaning of 'fair' and 'equitable' and the purpose and object of the Treaty that these terms
denote treatment in an even-handed and just manner, conducive to fostering the promotion and
protection of foreign investment and stimulating private initiative."). See also Azurix Corp. v.
The Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 1 307 (July 14, 2006) ("In the
preamble of the BIT, the parties agreed that 'fair and equitable treatment of investment is
desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use of
economic resources.' Therefore, the BIT itself is a document that requires certain treatment of
investment which the parties have considered necessary to "stimulate the flow of private
capital.").
209. See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of BulgariaCase No. ARB/03/24 ICSID, Decision on
jur., § 193 (Feb. 8, 2005). See also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 125; Saluka, supra
note 73, § 300 ("The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but
rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign investment and
extending and intensifying the parties' economic relations. That in turn calls for a balanced
approach to the interpretation of the Treaty's substantive provisions for the protection of
investments, since an interpretation which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign
investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign investments and so
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In light of the above-mentioned trends in treaty interpretation, the role of
environmental concerns inserted in recent IIAs' preambles are not clear.
Given that tribunals must, unless provided otherwise, interpret the
agreement in accordance with the principles set forth in the Vienna
Convention, one may argue that the new drafting trends will push tribunals
to increasingly engage with non-commercial concerns. 210 In practice,
however, references to public interest in IAs preambles are still unusual, and
often, tribunals determine that the treaty provisions should be interpreted in
favor of the protection of foreign investment.211 A main challenge for
environmental references inserted in preambles is to overcome the apparent
obstacle of tribunals' common conception of the object and purpose of HAs
as being the promotion and protection of foreign investment. Admittedly,
environmental preambular language is part of the "context" of a given
provision contained in the same treaty, as stated in the Vienna Convention.
Therefore, such language is available to and should be used by arbitral
tribunals as a tool to interpret unclear provisions in a way that would ensure
environmental concerns are considered in the tribunal's reasoning. Such
findings have proven to be true in the WTO framework where preambular
language has played an important interpretative role.212

The protection of the environment has not been considered by tribunals
as an objective of IIAs per se, when such concerns are included in the treaty's
preamble-not mentioning the cases where they are not. Environmental
references only "position environmental concerns in relation to the treaties'
main purpose-investment protection."213 The Metalclad award illustrates
these concerns, amongst the few cases with an environmental aspect taken in
application of a IA, which the preamble contains a reference to the
undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying the parties' mutual economic
relations.").
210. See Spears, supra note 167, at 293.
211. Id. at 292 (citing MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Rep. of Chile, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/7, Award, $ 104 (May 25, 2004) at, in which the tribunal interpreted the treaty
provision "in the manner most conducive to fulfill the objective of the BIT to protect
investments and create conditions favourable to investments."). See also SGS Socintd g6ndrale
de surveillance SA v. Rep. of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jur., ¶ 116
(Jan. 29, 2004) (The tribunal held that the BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal
protection of investments. According to the preamble it is intended "to create and maintain
favourable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of
the other. It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favor the
protection of covered investments."). The author also points that in the context of the
Argentine crisis cases, in which some Argentine BITs contained preambular language on noneconomic policy objectives, such as the United States-Argentina BIT ("Recognizing that the
development of economic and business ties can contribute to the well-being of workers in both
parties and promote respect for internationally recognized worker rights"), the tribunals
"assumed [this non-economic policy objective] to be a natural outcome of achieving the
investment protection and promotion objectives of the treaty."). Spears, supra note 167, at 291.
212. Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Lise Johnson, Belgium's Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty: A Review, (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/belgiumsmodel-bit.pdf.
213. Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 14.
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environment. In application of NAFTA Chapter 11, the tribunal in
Metalad took a conservative posture, which did not take into account the
environmental purpose of the measure in interpreting the notion of measure
tantamount to an expropriation under article 1110.214 Despite the references
to the protection of the environment and sustainable development contained
in NAFTA's preamble,215 the tribunal focused solely on the clauses referring
to the investors' protection, without mentioning the preamble's
environmental provisions.216 The tribunal's "pick and choose" approach is
even more troubling because NAFTA's preambular environmental language
is supported by the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC), an environmental side agreement to the NAFTA,
and could also have been read in conjunction with the article 1114 of
NAFTA's Chapter 11 itself, which states that "[n]othing in . . . Chapter

[Eleven] shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with [Chapter Eleven] that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns."217 In the S.D.
Myers case, the tribunal embraced a more inclusive interpretation of the
NAFTA preamble, without impacting the interpretation of indirect
expropriation.218

The analysis of the Metalclad tribunal cast doubts on the willingness of
tribunals to give a meaningful role to environmental concerns expressed in
future IIAs' preambles. Even if the insertion of environmental concerns in
IIA preambles were to become systematic, their role as an interpretative tool
would remain uncertain if the arbitral practice did not evolve. Interpreting
IIAs' unclear provisions in a protective way for the investment, potentially at
the expense of the state's regulatory power in the field of environment, does
not seem consistent with the current evolution of international investment
law treaty drafting. It is also noteworthy that the protection of environment,
and the need to promote sustainable investments are usually not referred to
as objectives or goals of the treaty. When included in preambles, such
clauses rather express a concern that should inform the actual goal of the
214. See Metaklad, supra note 85.
215. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 45, at pmbl. (NAFTA's preamble
states that the parties are resolved to "[e]nsure a predictable commercial framework for business
planning and investment . . . in a manner consistent with environmental protection and
conservation;" "[p]romote sustainable development.. . [and] [strengthen the development and
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.").
216. See Metalcad, supra note 71. ("The Parties to NAFTA specifically agreed to "ENSURE a
predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment." NAFTA further
requires that "[e]ach Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative
rulings of general application respecting any matter covered by this Agreement are promptly
published or otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable interested persons and
Parties to become acquainted with them.").
217. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 45, at art. 1114.
218. S.D. Myers, supra note 44, at T 196.
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treaty: the protection and promotion of foreign investments.219 This finding
tends to limit the interpretative role of preambular environmental language,
at least when they are not accompanied by substantive references in the core
of the agreement, despite the fact that HAs often state that the objective of
the treaty is protection and promotion of investment in furtherance of the
treaty parties' economic growth, prosperity, and/or development.
Preambles have a key a role in the determination the object and purpose
of a treaty. In the context of HAs, such object and purpose should not be
immutable. Recent trends in international economic law have shown that
the protection of foreign investors is shifting towards the promotion of
foreign investments within a context of sustainable development. Such
finding is reinforced by the growing inclusion of investment chapters in
FTAs. Consequently, preambles should be used by tribunals to promote the
objective of sustainable development and give rise to interpretations of
substantive norms which give full attention to states' legitimate intent to
protect the environment. Recent instruments like Norway's Model BIT or
the Japan-Switzerland FTA contain detailed preambular language, a general
exception clause, and a right to regulate clause,220 which express a
commitment to replace sustainable development at the core of international
investment law. This use of environmental language in the preamble,
supported by exceptions in the core of the HA, could bring about a shift in
arbitral tribunals' interpretation of substantive provisions. The
simultaneous use of preambular language with substantive standards
referring to the environment in the text of the treaty could lead to a
mutually supportive interpretation of the terms of the treaty.

B.

CLAUSEs REAFFIRMING THE HOST STATE'S

RIGHT

TO

REGULATE

1.

Between PoliticalStatements and Pleonasms: The Limited Impact of
"Right to Regulate" Provisions

Turning now to IAs' substantial provisions engaging with environment
concerns, the first highlighted category of clauses is those which seek to
reserve a certain level policy space for environmental regulation.221 These
219. See Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 14.
220. The Japan-Switzerland FTA (2009) contains extensive references to environmental
concerns in its preamble, as well as a substantial clause on "Health, Safety and Environmental
Measures" within the core of the agreement, which reads as follow:
"The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment activities by relaxing
domestic health, safety or environmental measures or lowering labour standards. To this effect,
each Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such measures and standards as an
encouragement for establishment, acquisition or expansion of investments in its Area."
221. See Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 14. According to the authors, they are the oldest and
most frequent type in OECD's sample.
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clauses are frequent in BITs negotiated by Canada222 and the United
States,223 which contain a reaffirmation of the state's right to regulate. The
investment chapters of the NAFTA and the (Trans-Pacific Partnership) TPP
also feature a similar provision. Article 9.16 of the TPP, modeled after
NAFTA article 1114, reads as follow: "Nothing in this Chapter shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate
to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives."224
These clauses do not provide arbitrators with any guidance on how to
weigh public interest arguments against investors' rights.225 IIAs provisions
that affirm the state parties' right to regulate in environmental matters are
broad political statements. They merely recognize that states are not
prevented from adopting laws "otherwise consistent" with the treaty. First,
their impact is limited because they formulate a right that is already granted
to them and fail to provide for additional regulatory flexibility to implement
environmental measures. 226 By definition, if a government enforces a
regulation "consistent" with the substantive standards of the applicable
treaty-i.e. not prohibited under the treaty itself-the state will not violate
any of its obligations under that treaty. The clause is, therefore, a mere
statement that the state can adopt domestically a behavior which is itself,
ceterisparibus,not prohibited under international law. Accordingly, "right to
regulate" provisions are void political statements or from a strictly legal
point of view, a pleonasm.227
222. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Latvia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 17, Can.-Lat., May 5,
2009. See also Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 14. This type of provisions has been replaced
in Canada's BITs by more detailed general exception clauses.
223. See, e.g., The two latest BITs signed by the United States: Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Rwanda-U.S., Jan. 1,
2012 and Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Uru.-U.S., Nov. 1,
2006. See also Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 14.
224. Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 9.16, Feb. 4, 2016.
225. See NEwCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 507 ("at most [article 1114 NAFTA] might
serve as an interpretive presumption that non-discriminatory environmental measures made in
good faith do not contravene investment obligations." It is noteworthy that NAFTA tribunals,
even in cases involving an assessment of the validity of an environmental measure, have largely
ignored article 1114.).
226. Id. at 509.
227. This trend seems to be evolving. For example, the recent Argentina-Qatar BIT, signed on
November 6, 2016, affirms the Member States' right to regulate to achieve "legitimate policy
objectives," without requiring at the same time the measures to be otherwise consistent with the
substantive provisions of the treaty. It reads as follows: "None of the provisions of this
Agreement shall affect the inherent right of the Contracting Parties to regulate within their
territories through measures necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the
protection of public health, safety, the environment, public morals, social and consumer
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Second, they fail to address the relevant issue at stake, which is the tension
faced by a government seeking to implement a general regulation or a
targeted measure between the host country's domestic legal frameworks and
its commitments under the applicable IA. Such tension exists because
domestic regulatory frameworks are, from the perspective of the tribunal,
not the substantive law of the case but a fact that the tribunal takes into
consideration to assess the lawfulness of the host country's measures under
international law (including the treaty upon which the claim is based).
Public policies implemented by states, such as environmental measures or
health prevention, are implemented at the domestic level. To be effective,
provisions seeking to safeguard policy space must elevate the right to
regulate under international law, i.e. in the treaty itself, without
subordinating it to the protections otherwise granted by the treaty-with a
potential risk of undermining the effectiveness of the protection standards.
For this reason, targeted exclusion mechanisms may be more appropriate.

2.

Variations of the 'Right to Regulate' Principle in 11As

Considering the limitations of first generation "right to regulate" clauses,
several variations in the wording of these provisions have been observed. In
particular, Colombia's Model BIT (2007) features a "right to regulate"
clause, which substitutes a proportionality test to the traditional requirement
that the measure must be consistent with the other provisions of the
agreement. 228 This adjustment could have important consequences on the
application by tribunals and could provide states with new defenses,
especially if these clauses are combined with preambular language or general
exceptions.229 This provision has been incorporated in the ColombiaTurkey BIT;230 and the Colombia-United Kingdom BIT also contains a
similar proportionality test alongside a requirement that the measures be
non-discriminatory.231 The Colombia-France BIT combines the two
protection." The Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the Argentine
Republic and the State of Qatar, Arg.-Qatar, art. 10, Arg.-Qatar, Nov. 6, 2016.
228. Colombia Model BIT (2007), which reads as follows: "Nothing in this Chapter shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure that it
considers appropriate to ensure that an investment activity in its territory is undertaken in
accordance with the environmental law of the Party, provided that such measures are
proportional to the objectives sought." Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments Between the Republic of Colombia and [Country] Colombian Model August
2007, art. VIII, Aug. 2007.
229. See, e.g., the Colombia-Turkey BIT (2014) which this clause as well as a general exception
clause (art. 6) and preambular language expressing the parties' "conviction" that the objectives
of the treaty "can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental measures of
general application." Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the
Government of the Republic of Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection
of Investments, pmbl., Colom.-Turk., July 28, 2014.
230. Id. at art. 11.
231. Acuredo Entre El Gobierno de la Republica de Colombia y El Gobierno de la Republica
Francesa Sobre El Fomento y Proteccion Reciprocos de Inversiones, Colom.-Fr., Oct. 7, 2014;
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approaches, recognizing the right of a state party to implement nondiscriminatory environmental measures, proportionate to the objective
sought, as long as they are consistent with the provisions on expropriation
contained in Article 6 of the BIT.232 Amongst the BITs most recently signed
by Colombia, the Colombia-Peru BIT, the Colombia-India BIT, and the
Colombia-Israel FTA do not feature a "right to regulate" provision at all.233
Following a different approach, Belgium and Luxemburg linked the right
to regulate to the right to modify or adopt environmental legislation,234
using language frequently found in FTAs.235 Such provisions seek to
recognize the right for a party to determine which levels of regulations it
finds adequate at the domestic level.236 Article 5.2 of the Belgian Model BIT
reads as follows:
[R]ecognising the right of each Contracting Party to establish its own
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental policies
and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental
legislation each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure that its
legislation provides for internationally agreed levels of environmental
protection and shall strive to continue to improve its legislation.237
The impact of these clauses in investment agreements is very limited, as
they only contain "aspirational obligations."238 In international trade law,
similar environmental provisions are supported by a long-standing practice
Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Republic of
Colombia , art. 8, U.K.-Colom., Oct. 10, 2014.
232. Acuredo Entre El Gobierno de la Republica de Colombia y El Gobierno de la Republica
Francesa Sobre El Fomento y Proteccion Reciprocos de Inversiones, Colom.-Fr., Oct. 7, 2014.
233. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government
of the Republic of Peru on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Colom.Peru, Dec. 30, 2010; Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the
Government of the State of Israel for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Colom.-Isr., Sept. 30, 2013; and Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
Between the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of India, Colom.-India, July 3, 2013.
234. Agreement Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and Montenegro on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Bel.-Lux.-Montenegro, Feb. 16, 2010.
235. Compare with Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 214, at art. 20.3(2) ("The
Parties 'recognize the sovereign right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic
environmental protection and its own environmental priorities, and to establish, adopt or
modify its environmental laws and policies accordingly.' ).
236. A parallel can be drawn with the Agreement on the application of sanitary and
phytosanitary measures (SPS) of the WTO, which established a right to each country to set
their own standard, as long as they are applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, based on scientific principles, not maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence (art. 2.2 SPS) and "do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail." (art. 2.3 SPS). The WTO Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Jan. 1,
1995), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/spsagr-e.htm.
237. Belgium-Luxemburg, supra note 234, at art. 5.1.
238. See Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 203, at 21-2.
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of environmental exceptions within the WTO framework. Using similar
provisions in IIAs certainly help contracting parties to make a statement on
their concern to enact domestic regulations and manifest some states'
willingness for a more balanced approach to investment protection. Yet,
these provisions can hardly support a state defense before an arbitral tribunal
that a violation of an investor's right should be excused or wiped out because
of its right to regulate, or similarly, an alleged obligation to "strive to
continue to improve its legislation;"239 nor they seem capable to shape the
application of the treaty's standards by arbitral tribunals, for instance, by
reducing the scope of the array of situations potentially qualified as treaty
violations. These provisions may even be explicitly excluded from the scope
of the treaty's dispute settlement mechanism, as it is the case in the United
States 2012 Model BIT,240 illustrating that as innovative as they can be,241
"right to regulate" clauses are not suited to mitigate imbalances within HAs
regarding the protection of host countries' public interest. If only
protection standards are enforceable-by opposition to provisions seeking to
safeguard states' policy space-the bias in favor of investors will remain
despite a growing occurrence of environmental provisions in HAs.
Articles reaffirming the host state's right to regulate are not, in their
current form, phrased in a way that could be enforced by arbitral tribunals.
They come short of elevating the nature or status of environmental
regulations, which remain analyzed by tribunals through the prism of
domestic law. Domestic law cannot supersede the standards of protection
contained in HAs. If a domestic regulation conflicts with a right granted to
investors by an IIA or, to put in less controversial terms, to a standard of
protection agreed upon by the state parties, the protection of investors will
prevail. To bear any effects, the provisions granting policy space on one
hand and investors' rights on the other have to be inserted in HAs on an
equal footing.

C.
1.

"NoT LOWERING STANDARDS" PROVISIONS

A Type of Provision Explicitly or De Facto Excluded from the Scope of
Dispute Settlement

Borrowed from the international trade legal framework, clauses that
discourage states to lower their environmental standards are sometimes
found in ILAs,242 with the aim to promote a continuous enhancement of the
domestic environmental framework of the parties, or at least, to prevent a

1
239. Belgium-Luxemburg, supra note 234, at art. 5.2.
240. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 24.1,
2012.
241. See Gordon & Pohl, supra note 32, at 15.
242. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of
Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, supra note
213, at art. 12
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race to the bottom. If such provisions can be meaningful to orientate public
policies and to avoid a race to the bottom, they do not directly seek to grant
host states further policy space. Within the international trade framework,
such provisions are used to limit the ability of contracting states to decrease
their environmental standards to gain an economic advantage at the expense
of its trading partners. But their use seems less meaningful in the context of
IAs given that their actual impact on locational determinants of MNEs is
questionable. Some IAs have linked "not lowering standard" clauses to
consultation mechanisms, which illustrates the "soft" character of this type
of provision.243
2.

Deference to the Host State's Engagements under Applicable
InternationalEnvironmentalAgreements

Some IAs feature a "hierarchy of norms" approach to incorporate
environmental concerns in order to provide guidance to arbitral tribunals in
case of conflicts between a state's international obligation arising from
international environment law.244 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade
"1. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws.
Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner
that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those laws as an encouragement
for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its
territory. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such an
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two
Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement."
243. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 509 (citing Agreement Between Canada and
the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 11, Can.-Peru,
Nov. 14, 2006, which reads as follows: "The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.
Accordingly, a Paby should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment,
acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party
considers that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations
with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such
encouragement.").
244. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 45, at art. 104.1, which
provides that:
"1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade
obligations set out in:
a) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, done at Washington, March 3, 1973, as amended June 22, 1979,
b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at
Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June 29, 1990,
c) the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, done at Basel, March 22, 1989, on its entry
into force for Canada, Mexico and the United States, or
d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1,
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Agreement (CETA) also features a chapter on "Trade and Environment"
with various references to multilateral environmental agreements to which
the member states are parties245 reaffirming the commitment of each party to
"effectively implement in its law and practices, in its whole territory, the
multilateral environmental agreements to which it is party."246
The recourse to a systemic approach is quite unusual in BITs and
investment chapters of FTAs. Yet, such provisions could have a dual impact:
allowing for values and norms "external to investment regimes"247 to play a
role in investment arbitration and replacing international investment law
within a broader field of sustainable development, including not only
economic goals but also environmental and human rights concerns. Such
approach would force arbitral tribunals to integrate external values into their
reasoning and possibly grant primacy to non-commercial provisions when
they enter in conflict with standards of protection, which they have
traditionally been reluctant to do.248 But several factors mitigate this finding.
First, provisions modeled on article 104 of NAFTA are rare, and even where
included in an IIA forming a basis of a dispute, the arbitral tribunal is not
likely to find a material inconsistency between the provisions of an
international environmental agreements and the substantive standards
granted by the IIA but will rather attempt to read them harmoniously.249
Second, such provisions address only indirectly the lack of coherency in the
interpretation of the substantive rights granted by IAs. In other words, they
such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that where
a Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of
complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least
inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement."
245. See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 23.4 -.5, E.U.-Can., Oct.
30, 2016. Article 24.3 'Right to regulate and levels of protection' reads as follows: "The Parties
recognise the right of each Party to set its environmental priorities, to establish its levels of
environmental protection, and to adopt or modify its laws and policies accordingly and in a
manner consistent with the multilateral environmental agreements to which it is party and with
this Agreement. Each Party shall seek to ensure that those laws and policies provide for and
encourage high levels of environmental protection, and shall strive to continue to improve such
laws and policies and their underlying levels of protection."
246. Id. at art. 23.5(2).
247. Di BENEDETTO, supra note 21, at 134.
248. Id. at 137.
249. See, e.g., S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov't of Can., UNCITRAL, Partial Award, j 247 (Nov. 13,
2000) The Tribunal considers that the legal context of Article 1102 includes the various
provisions of the NAFTA, its companion agreement the NAAEC, and principles that are
affirmed by the NAAEC (including those of the Rio declaration). The principles that emerge
from that context, to repeat, are as follows:
* states have the right to establish high levels of environmental protection. They
are not obliged to compromise their standards merely to satisfy the political or
economic interests of other states;
* states should avoid creating distortions to trade;
* environmental protection and economic development can and should be mutually
supportive." (emphasis added).
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do not constitute provisions that could provide arbitral tribunals with
leverage in assessing a state's behavior under a IIA when such behavior,
undertaken for legitimate public interest concerns, would have otherwise
resulted in a violation of the treaty.

D.

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS, EXCLUSIONS, LANGUAGE
CLARIFICATION, AND INTERPRETATIVE NOTES

We now turn to a major innovation in HA drafting: the inclusion of
provisions specifically aimed at reducing the scope of an HA and articles
subject to ISDS by excluding a subject matter-the protection of the
environment, from the scope of a provision, or the entire treaty.
1.

Language Clarifications, Interpretative Footnotes, and Exclusions

a.

An Overview of the Existing Approaches

In reaction to concerns that noi-discriminatory regulations could be
challenged before tribunals based on the prohibition of indirect
expropriation standards contained by most IIAs, several states have included
language clarifications250 to limit the extent of which regulatory measures
could result in a violation of the standards of protection. These
clarifications are usually contained in footnotes following the main text of
the article covering expropriation or in an annex to the treaty. They explain
the conditions under which environmental regulation can or cannot be
considered indirect expropriation.251 Although they only apply to indirect
expropriation scenarios, the reasoning that must be undertaken by
arbitrators is quite similar to that under general exceptions. If the state can
establish the environmental purpose of the measure that allegedly led to a
substantial deprivation of the investor's rights, the burden shifts to the
investor who has to prove that the measure was arbitrary, discriminatory, or
taken in bad faith (according to the conditions imposed by the provision) to
bring back the measure into the scope of the article to obtain compensation.
250. Gehring & Kent, supra note 167, at 294.
251. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, supra note 230 (stating "Annex B Expropriation . . . (b) Except in rare
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations." For an example of provision inserted
in the article on expropriation, see Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and Republic of Colombia, supra note 222, at art. 6.2(c) ("non-discriminatory measures
that the Contracting Parties take for reasons of public purpose or social interest (which shall
have a meaning compatible with that of 'public purpose') including for reasons of public health,
safety, and environmental protection, which are taken in good faith, which are not arbitrary,
and which are not disproportionate in light of their purpose, shall not constitute indirect
expropriation."). See also Free Trade Agreement between the Gov't of New Zealand and the

Government of the People's Republic of China, N.Z.-China, Apr. 7, 2008.
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Otherwise, the measure is excluded from the scope of the clause limiting the
ability of states to expropriate foreign investors without compensation. If
that is the case, the traditional test to determine first is a substantial
deprivation occurred, and second, if the criteria for an unlawful
expropriation were met, the clause becomes superfluous.
b.

Revisiting the Police Powers?

These provisions share similarities with the police powers doctrine,252
especially with regards to the flexibility given to governments to implement
public interest-related, non-discriminatory measures without the threat of
compensation. The regulatory power of states is a legitimate and inherent
prerogative; financial consequences on foreign-owned interests should,
therefore, not be considered as expropriatory if the deprivation was caused in
application of such powers. 253 But the application by investment arbitration
tribunals of the police powers doctrine has created uncertainty on the
criteria that should be weighted by states. Most arbitral awards were
decided in application of traditional investment instruments, which only
contained a prohibition of unlawful expropriations without limiting its scope
of application. A case-by-case analysis was preferred to the establishment of
clear criteria that would be applied to all investment cases. 254
The recourse to "language clarification" provisions in IIAs certainly
provide policymakers with more certainty. The question remains, however,
whether exclusions mechanisms could prevent investors from bringing
reasonable claims before investment tribunals by excluding their claims ex
ante solely based on the environmental nature of the challenged regulation.
"Clarification" clauses provide several safeguards, which seek to avoid such
consequences. First, a regulatory measure, to be excluded from the scope of
indirect expropriation, must usually be non-discriminatory and designed and
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment.255 Second, some BITs go further; for instance,
the Japan-Peru BIT features a very detailed clause that builds on the
previous arbitral decisions in order to ensure that the tribunal will follow a
balanced analysis taking into account all the interests at stake.256 Third,
arbitral tribunals retain a significant margin of appreciation to determine on
a case-by-case basis whether a given clause is "non-discriminatory" and
252. But see, DE NANTEuIL, supra note 134, at 517, distinguishing the police powers as being an
exception, while qualifying the clauses reserving policy space as an "exclusion" mechanism. The
measure which constitutes an exclusion falls outside the scope of the provision (no
compensation is due because the measure is not expropriatory), whereas a measure which is an
exception is an expropriation, however, the duty to compensate is waived.
253. OECD, INT'L INVESTmENT LAW: A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 51 (2005).
254. Id. at 58.
255. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, supra note
230, at Annex B.
256. Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion, Protection and
Liberalisation of Investment Annex IV, Japan-Peru, Dec. 10, 2009
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"designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives."
Fourth, several treaties provide arbitrators with a loophole to decide that
even if the above-mentioned test is met, the measure represents "rare
circumstances" in which the measure still leads to the characterization of an
indirect expropriation.257 The tribunal itself is left with the determination of
what "circumstances" would be sufficiently extreme to qualify an otherwise
legitimate public interest measure as expropriatory.
2.

GeneralException Clauses

a.

An Overview of the Existing Approaches
General exception clauses follow an inverted approach borrowed from

international trade law.258 Modeled on Article XX of the GAIT,259 these

exceptions allow states to retain policy space in limited subject areas,
provided that the measures are non-discriminatory and are not used as
disguised restrictions on investment or trade.260 In HAs, they seek to exclude
". . . (b) The determination of whether a measure or series of measures by a
Contracting Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation
requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the fact
that such measure or series of measures has an adverse effect on the economic
value of investments, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect
expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the measure or series of measures interferes with
distinct, reasonable expectations arising out of investments; and
(iii) the characteristic of the measure or series of measures, including whether
such measure or series of measures are non- discriminatory; and
(c) non-discriminatory measures that the Contracting Parties take for reasons of
public purpose or social interest (which shall have a meaning compatible with that
of "public purpose") including for reasons of public health, safety, and
environmental protection, which are taken in good faith, which are not arbitrary,
and which are not disproportionate in light of their purpose, shall not constitute
indirect expropriation."
257. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, supra note
230, at Annex B.

258. Supnik, supra note 33, at 362.
259. Gen. Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 20, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
260. See, e.g., Agreement between Canada and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of

Investments art. 10, 2004, which reads as follows:
"1. Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that
would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between investments or
between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade or investment,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or
enforcing measures necessary:
(a) to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(b) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement; or
(c) for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources."
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from the scope of the agreement measures relating to the protection of, inter
alia, human, animal, or plant life, public health, or the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources. States retain leeway in the implementation of
general regulatory measures, including certain environmental regulations
that would otherwise be impaired by the strict fulfillment of the treaty
obligations.261 Regarding the distribution of these provisions, FTAs are
increasingly featuring general exception clauses in their investment
chapters262 while they remain rare in BITs, with Canada leading the way with
numerous BITs containing an exception mechanism.263 Colombia also
drafted a general exception clause and inserted it in several of its negotiated
BITs.264 But general exception clauses in BITs are still uncommon. 265
b.

How Efficient are General Exceptions in an International
Investment Law Context?

The efficiency of general exception clauses depends on the scope of the
article itself. Some have pointed to the dangers of exceptions clauses drafted
too inclusively, which bear a risk, assuming investors do take into account
IIA provisions as a locational determinant, of frustrating "the objectives of
fields such as climate change in which private investment is badly needed."266
It is necessary to stress, however, that exception clauses using the same
phrasing as Article XX of the GA'IT only apply to "non-discriminatory
measures" which are not used as "disguised restriction on investment or
261. Di BENEDETTO, supra note 21, at 160.
262. See, e.g., ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 17, Mar. 29, 2012, which was
modeled on GATT art. XX, "chapeau" included; Investment Agreement for the COMESA
Common Investment Area art. 22, May 23, 2007, also modeled from GATT art. XX which
contains an exception for measures "designed and applied to protect the environment" (art
22.1(c)); Free Trade Agreement between Australia and Singapore, Austl.-Sing., Feb. 17, 2003;
and Agreement on Investment and Trade in Services Between Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua art. 8.02, Mar. 24, 2002, which incorporates GATS art.
XIV.
263. See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Czech Republic for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Can.-Czech, June 5, 2009; Agreement Between Canada and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Jordan,
June 28, 2009; Agreement Between Canada and the State of Kuwait for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Can.-Kuwait, Sept. 26, 2011; Agreement Between the Government
of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-China, Jan. 10, 2014; Canada-Cote d'Ivoire
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Can.-Cote d'Ivoire, Nov. 30, 2014.
264. See, e.g., Acuerdo Entre El Gobierno de La Republica de Singapur y El Gobierno de La
Republica De Colombia Sobre Promocion Y Proteccion De Inversiones, Colom.-Sing., July 12,
2013; Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Colombia for the Liberalization,
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Colom.-Japan, Sept. 12, 2011; and Agreement
Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the Republic of
Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Colom.-Turk.,
July 28, 2014.
265. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 501.

266. Gehring & Kent, supra note 167, at 293
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trade"267-a sufficient safeguard not to require further amputation of the
substantive scope of the exception. The trend in IIA drafting also shows that
general exception clauses used in IAs borrow the same closed list of
exceptions than that of Article XX-measures that seek to protect human,
animal, or plant life, and public health, to prevent disease and pests in
268
animals or plants and/or to conserve exhaustible natural resources.
be
fact
in
Further limitations of the scope of general exception clauses could
269
For
counter-productive and narrow the regulatory flexibility of the state.
the
of
prevention
at
"the
aiming
to
measures
instance, an exception limited
trade
in
the
relevant
is
plants"270
or
animals
in
pests
and
spread of diseases
context to help governments implement measures to limit certain types of
exports but would not be as relevant in the context of the movement of
capital. They could even frustrate the reasoning developed by several
arbitral tribunals, which approved measures aimed at the protection of
public policy and rejected the investor claim based on the police powers of
the state despite the absence of an exception provision in the treaty.
Similarly, a clause covering "any measure necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health"271 would only provide a weak defense in case
of measures regulating sensitive sectors such as mining projects, amongst
other situations where the host government could have an interest in
267. See Gordon and Pohl, supra note 32, at 15-6.
268. See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Serbia for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments art. 18, Can.-Serb., Sept. 1, 2014 (stating: "For the purpose of this
Agreement:
(a) a Party may adopt or enforce a measure necessary:
(i) to protect human, animal or plant life or health,
(ii) to ensure compliance with domestic law that is not inconsistent with this
Agreement, or
(iii) for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources;
(b) provided that the measure referred to in subparagraph (a) is not:
(i) applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between investments or between investors, or
(ii) a disguised restriction on international trade or investment.").
269. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 505.
270. This narrow type of provision can be found in treaties negotiated in the 1990s, see e.g.,
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the
Republic of Korea on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-Kor., Feb. 26, 2002;
see also Agreement Between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of
New Zealand for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 5(3), Arg.-N.Z.,
Aug. 27, 1999 (reads as follow: "The provisions of this Agreement shall in no way limit the right
of either Contracting Party to take any measures (including the destruction of plants and
animals, confiscation of property or the imposition of restrictions on stock movement)
necessary for the protection of natural and physical resources or human health, provided such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified
discrimination.").
271. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the
Government of Japan for the Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Kor.Japan, Mar. 22, 2002.
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regulating pursuant to the principle of precaution. For this reason, while
exception clauses can provide explicit guidance to achieve the adequate
balance between investors' rights and states' right to regulate,272 where
applicable, their drafting should not be limited to a narrow list modeled on
Article XX of the GATT, but rather seek to embrace the specificities of
international investment law. In this regard, the exception clause of the
China-Colombia BIT provides a very innovative drafting, which not only
emancipates from the traditional list of Article XX and incorporates the
needs of international investment law to balance investors' rights and states'
ability to regulate but also provides arbitrators with a step-by-step analysis
which arguably limits the uncertainty around general and targeted
regulatory measures. It reads as follow:
1. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed so as to
prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining measures intended to
preserve public order including measures to protect the essential
security interests of the State, provided that such measures:
a) are only applied where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is
posed to one of the fundamental interests of society;
b) are not applied in a manner constituting arbitrary discrimination;
c) do not constitute a disguised restriction on investment;
d) are proportional to the objective they seek to achieve;
e) are necessary and are applied and maintained only while
necessary; and
f) are applied in a transparent manner and in accordance with the
respective national legislation.
For greater clarity, nothing under this paragraph shall be construed to
limit the review by an arbitral tribunal of a matter when such exception
is invoked.273
But one may nonetheless argue that the interpretation of such types of
provision raises a new series of questions regarding the threshold required to
qualify the state's behavior as constituting an "arbitrary discrimination" or a
"disguised restriction on investment," and more generally what the general
discretion vested in the arbitral tribunal in applying such standard.
c.

Interpretative Issues Associated with General Exceptions

Detailed provisions such as Article 12 of the China-Colombia BIT's are
rare. The growing recourse to general exceptions has raised numerous
interpretative issues. 2 7 4 First, as Andrew Newcombe and Llufs Paradell
pointed, if a regulatory measure meets the requirement of a general
exception provision, it is very unlikely that it could ever be a violation of the
272. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 503.
273. Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the
Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People's Republic of
China art. 12, Colom.-China, Nov. 22, 2008.
274. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 503.
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minimum standard of treatment given the threshold the clause requires.275
As a consequence, the tribunal would not need to apply the exception.276
But this question would still be relevant if the FET provision is interpreted
by the tribunal as imposing a higher threshold to the host state, especially
regarding the protection of the legitimate expectations of the investor.
Second, general exception clauses do not provide any guidance with respect
to the protection against expropriatory measures. 277 Does the exception
apply as a complete waiver of the obligation to pay compensation, thereby
excluding the qualification of expropriation; or does it only render an
otherwise unlawful expropriation lawful?278 This question is left to the
tribunal. Another critical issue concerns the articulation between general
exception clauses and other provisions such as articles reaffirming the host
state's right to regulate or environmental references in the agreement's
preamble. It is doubtful that such references will have an impact in the
interpretation by the tribunal of the general exception clause itself. A key
challenge for future panels, in the context of a treaty containing an exception
clause combined with preambular language, will be to reach a satisfactory
outcome regarding both the protection of foreign investors and the
promotion of states' policies fostering sustainable development.
275. Id. at 505 (The authors stress that under the general exception, "the conduct in question
would have to be (i) necessary to meet one of the three enumerated exception (i.e. that there was
no other alternative that would reasonable (sic) meet the policy objective); (ii) not have been
applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination; and (iii) not
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or investment.").
276. A similar conclusion can be made in cases of unlawful expropriation where the due process
requirement is missing. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v. The Republic of
Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-2, award (15 Mar. 2016), (1 6.66-67). The Tribunal, after
characterizing the State's measures as "made in an arbitrary manner and without due process",
the Tribunal went to conclude that the general exception clause of the applicable BIT could not
apply "given its introductory proviso", which required a measure, in order to fall within the
scope of the exception clause, not to be "applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner"
(Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of
Ecuador for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 29 Apr. 1996,
article XVII.3).
277. Nonetheless, see Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People's
Republic of China, supra note 273, on general exceptions, which stipulates that "For greater
clarity, this Article shall not be construed as an exception to the obligations set out in Article 4
(Expropriation and Compensation) concerning compensation." See also Agreement Between
Japan and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion, Protection and Liberalisation of Investment,
supra note 244, which expands the scope of the general exception clause, adding a note: "It is
understood that paragraph 1 of Article 19 [the general exception clause] includes measures to
protect the environment."
278. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 3, at 505-06. As stated by the two authors: "It
would be surprising if, by effect of general exceptions, parties to IAs intended to provide less
protection to foreign investors that that accorded under customary international law; thus if the
exception does not prevent a finding of expropriation (because the measure is a direct
expropriation) presumably it cannot exclude payment for compensation."
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An Approach Already Implemented by Arbitral Tribunals in the
Interpretation of the Traditional Standards of Protection?

The use of international trade language in IIAs seems logical for various
reasons. 279 Yet, the use of general exceptions containing the same language
as Article XX of the GATT does not guarantee the desired outcome of an
enhanced policy space to implement sound and non-discriminatory
environmental regulations. The fact that limitations of several subject areas
have proven effective in the context of trading in goods does not guarantee
that such limitations will render the clause adequate in the international
investment framework. The WTO Appellate Body developed a proven twostep analysis to determine the applicability of Article XX: the measure must
fall within one of the enumerated exceptions (a)-(g) and satisfy the
introductory section of Article XX (also referred to as the "chapeau").280
Given the current fragmentation of international investment arbitration
awards and given the fact that each claim arises under a different instrument
and without the equivalent of the WTO appellate body to harmonize the
interpretation of subsequent awards, it is doubtful that these provisions
would be applied consistently and coherently by arbitral tribunals. The
establishment of an appeal mechanism within the international investment
law framework would be a first step towards establishing a more predictable
framework to implement environmental regulations without excessive
challenges by investors.
Nonetheless, several reasons tend to demonstrate that the investment
arbitration practice would give full effect to general exceptions modeled on
Article XX. In the recent Unglaube case, 281 the tribunal used the same steps
than those required by Article XX in interpreting the FET standard.282 The
tribunal declared that:
Where . . . a valid public policy does exist, and especially where the

action or decision taken relates to the State's responsibility "for the
protection of public health, safety, morals or welfare, as well as other
functions related to taxation and police powers of states," such measures
are accorded a considerable measure of deference in recognition of the
right of domestic authorities to regulate matters with their borders. . ..
This deference, however, is not without limits. Even if such measures are
taken for an important public purpose, governments are required to use due
279. See e.g., Supnik, supra note 33, at 365-66 (International investment law and international
trade law both "involve international commerce"; they "share many of the same underlying
values." "Establishing a practice that resembles GATT's Article XX General Exceptions would
streamline future negotiations for a comprehensive, multilateral investment regime as part of
the WTO.").
280. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, U.S. - Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998).
281. Unglaube, supra note 53.
282. Di BENEDETITO, supra note 21, at 207.
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diligence in the protection of foreigners and will not be excused from
liability if their action has been arbitrary or discriminatory.283
To interpret the FET standard, the tribunal first expressed deference to
the public policies of the host state. 284 If a public policy exists and has been
the objective of the state's measure, it justifies "deference to the state
behavior, unless there was a proof of its arbitrariness or discriminatory
character."285 Such reasoning is like the approach tribunals would have to
follow when applying an IIA containing a general exception clause. The
consequence is a shift in the burden of proof when the investor claim arises
from the implementation of a measure taken in consideration of a public
policy. This solution is more satisfactory in the sense that it would mitigate
the bias of the current framework in favor of foreign investors and balance
the burden of proof, granting investors a possibility to prove that a measure
was discriminatory or arbitrary. Yet, a risk remains; the risk considered as
lawful would amount to a complete taking of the property-it is a risk which
can be explained by the lack of concern by the general exclusion clauses for
the impact of the measure on the investment, in a similar fashion, is a
critique that had been made for the police powers. 286
IV.

Conclusion

Integrating the protection of the environment, a non-commercial
objective, into HAs has proven to be a challenge given the different
stakeholders involved: the public interest on the one hand and foreign
investors who oppose the particular interest at hand on the other.287 Some
authors have pointed out that strong environmental provisions can decrease
the substantive protection granted by the treaty itself or more generally
frustrate sustainable development objectives.288 Yet, the existence of
difficulties in conciliating competing interests does not mean that these
difficulties should be avoided. Recent arbitration practices have shown the
dangers of excluding the public interest from HAs because IIAs play a crucial
role in determining the tribunal's power. As imperfect as it may be, the
inclusion of environmental language in IIAs, amongst other public interest
concerns, is a prerequisite for the resolution of the legitimacy crisis of
international investment law and the progression towards a more inclusive
approach to economic development. In other words, economic activity and
283. Unglaube, supra note 53, at 246-7.
284. Di BENEDETTO, supra note 21, at 207
285. Id. at 115.
286. DE NANTEUIL, supra note 134, at 523-24. The author argues that when the economic
value of the investor's property is fully destroyed, the foreign investor should not bear alone the
burden of the expropriation, even if it was undertaken for legitimate reasons. The measure
should amount to an expropriation for public purpose (i.e. lawful under the traditional criteria),
but without waiving the obligation to compensate.
287. Although some "green investments" could at the same time promote economic
development and sustainable use of natural resources (renewable energies, etc.).
288. Gehring & Kent, supra note 167, at 287; see also Diepeveen et al., supra note 17, at 147.
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public interest concerns, including the protection of the environment and
natural resources, cannot be treated separately. It does not mean that the
objective and structure of IAs must change; however, an inclusive approach
seems preferable in order to better reflect "the social dimension of
international investment,"289 including the protection of the environment.
The coherency of the investment framework that has been developed over
the years also needs to be considered when focusing on IAs' environmental
provisions.290 The lack of coherence of investment arbitration should not be
substituted by more incoherency within the international investment
framework itself. Not only the multiplication of HAs and their various
provisions create complexity, but new changes in IIAs drafting could
potentially have an impact on the protection ought to investors from other
contracting parties, or inversely be mitigated through the recourse to the
MFN clause.291 The protection of investors' legitimate rights and the
regulatory needs of the host country are primary objectives, but the
coherency of the investment framework as a whole has to be kept in mind
too, especially with the ongoing multiplication of investment chapters within
regional FTAs which superimpose over states' traditional bilateral
investment relations. It is perhaps the time to embrace again the idea of a
multilateral investment agreement. The multiplication of investment
chapters within broad regional trade agreements such as the CETA or the
TPP lays the foundation of such process.

&

289. Ortino, supra note 18, at 245-6.
290. UNCTAD, Definition de rigles internationalesen matired'investissements: itat des lieux, defis
relever et perspective, 35 (2008), http://unctad.org/fr/Docs/iteiit20073_fr.pdf.
291. On the multilateralization of international investment law through the mechanism of the
MFN treatment, see generally STPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INT'L

INv. L. 180-96 (2009).

